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ABSTRACT 
Train derailments or collisions have the potential to result in catastrophic 
loss of life and/or destruction of property. Ever higher demands for train 
density (i.e. trains per hour for a given section of track) as well as the 
catastrophic results when accidents do occur have given rise to the 
development of railway signalling systems as mitigation measures (Rolt, 
2009; Theeg & Vlasenko (2009b). 
 
Signals Passed At Danger (SPADs) refers to when a train driver passes a 
stop signal without authority and is one of the typical causes of such 
accidents resulting in significant damages reported within Transnet Freight 
Rail (TFR) in recent years. Studies have shown human train driver error 
and violation of signals to be a significant cause of SPAD events. 
 
This study investigated the application of train driver automation as a 
mitigation measure against SPADs within the South African railway 
environment in general and TFR in particular. The study was qualitative in 
nature, following a model development methodology and used in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with railway signalling engineers for data 
collection. The primary goal was defined to be the development of a train 
driver function automation method that could be considered the most 
appropriate within the TFR operational environment. 
 
The study determined the most appropriate method to be that of having a 
human driver with technical supervision. In this arrangement, the human 
driver could remain in his conventional role of driving the train but with a 
technical supervision system superimposed that automatically intervenes if 
a train driver exceeds his movement authority (e.g. Automatic Train 
Protection or ATP). This approach mitigates many of the costs imposed by 
human failure associated with SPAD events, yet retains the value of 
human flexibility which is especially useful under abnormal circumstances. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Since the construction of the first railways in South Africa in the 1860’s, 
the network has grown to a total length of roughly 23 273 route kilometers 
(Transnet Freight Rail, 2017; The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa, 
2015; Van der Merwe, 2008) and in 2015/16 alone carried 67.74 million 
train kilometers of railway traffic (passengers as well as freight) from South 
Africa’s major railway operators (Railway Safety Regulator, 2016). The 
major railway operators active in South Africa today are Transnet Freight 
Rail (TFR), Metrorail and Gautrain. Of these, TFR is by far the largest with 
a network consisting of 20 953 route kilometers (TFR, 2017). The Metrorail 
network consists of roughly 2 240 route kilometers (PRASA, 2015) while 
the Gautrain network consists of a mere 80 route kilometers (Railway 
Gazette, 2008).  
 
Of the 73.2 million train kilometers registered on average annually for the 
period 2013 to 2016, only 44.3 million (60.5%) represent TFR traffic (refer 
to Table 1.1) which is illustrative of the fact that the traffic densities (trains 
per hour) of freight traffic typically carried by TFR, is significantly less than 
that of passenger carriers like Metrorail and Gautrain. It should also be 
noted that as Metrorail-owned networks are predominantly limited to the 
greater metropolitan areas of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London, Metrorail trains sometimes utilise 
the TFR national network and operational control systems (Metrorail, 
2007). This arrangement includes the running of the long distance 
Shoshaloza Meryl passenger trains between Johannesburg, Cape Town 
and Durban (PRASA, 2013). For this reason, despite the fact that TFR is 
in the freight transportation business, TFR operations also include 
passenger traffic, making it a good candidate operator to scrutinize when 
16 
 
 
looking at railway operational methods and issues in the context of the 
South African railway. 
 
Table 1.1  South African Train Kilometers (Million) - Per Operator 
 
Source: South African Railway Safety Regulator (2015, p. 5); RSR (2016, 
p. 21) 
 
Railway transportation concentrates large quantities of people or goods on 
networks between various destinations. Inherent in this method of 
transportation also lies its great weakness: Train derailments or collisions 
have the potential to result in catastrophic loss of life and/or destruction of 
property. Ever higher demands for train density (i.e. trains per hour for a 
given section of track) as well as the catastrophic results when accidents 
do occur, have given rise to the development of railway signalling systems 
as mitigation measures (Rolt, 2009; Theeg & Vlasenko (2009b). 
 
The South African Railway Safety Regulator (RSR) has published the 
following data on the number of operational incidents as well as the 
associated cost in treasure and human life for the reporting periods 2013 
to 2016 (Table 1.2): 
 
Reporting Period Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) Metrorail (PRASA) Other Total TFR %
2013/14 46.9 25.0 4.4 76.3 61.5
2014/15 47.0 23.9 4.6 75.5 62.3
2015/16 39.0 22.2 6.5 67.7 57.6
Average: 44.3 23.7 5.2 73.2 60.5
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Table 1.2  Total operational occurances and associated costs 
 
Source: RSR (2016, p. 25, p.34, p. 51) 
The data from Table 1.2 demonstrates that operational safety incidents in 
South Africa, including the number of derailments, level crossing accidents 
and collisions have significant associated costs. The values indicated in 
the last column (costs) of Table 1.2 represent the reported direct economic 
costs connected with operational occurrences on South African railways. 
 
The RSR regulatory framework categorises operational occurrences into 
twelve categories designated A through L (RSR, 2016). These categories 
typically include collisions, derailments and level crossing incidents but 
also include fire, spillage and people or passenger related incidents. The 
operational safety failure under consideration in this study is that of a 
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD), which is defined as an incident where a 
train passes a signal displaying a stop indication or stop aspect, i.e. a red 
signal, without authorisation (Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 
2011). SPADs are the most serious precursors to railway accidents 
ascribable to operator error (Kyriakidis, Hirsch & Majumdar, 2012). These 
failures are assigned to RSR category C, the category dealing with 
unauthorised movements. 
 
  
Reporting Period Occurances Injuries Fatalities Costs (ZAR)
2013/14 4 587 1 498 456 383 393 522.12
2014/15 4 632 1 746 473 438 732 891.76
2015/16 4 250 2 290 453 587 766 960.84
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1.2 CONTEXT 
When considering the 3 year period 2013 to 2016, the average number of 
SPAD incidents reported on South African railway lines is 102.7 per year 
(Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3  Total SPAD Incidents – SA, AUS, UK 
 
Source: Data for column 2 from RSR (2015, p. 22); RSR (2016, p. 26) 
Source: Data for column 3 from Office of the National Rail Safety 
Regulator (2016, p. 26). Note that Australian data was read from a graph – 
the numbers may not be exact 
Source: Data for column 4 from Office of Rail and Road (2017c) 
 
When compared with Australian and British railway statistics and 
normalised to train kilometers travelled (Table 1.4), South Africa performed 
slightly better at 1.4 SPADs per million train kilometers when compared with 
Australia’s 1.5 and much worse than Britain which sits at 0.5 for the same 
period (Table 1.5). Train kilometers (total number of kilometers travelled by 
trains) was selected for normalisation because it is commonly available in 
railway safety reports and of all the published measures of railway capacity 
(i.e. passenger kilometers for passenger trains or ton kilometers for freight 
trains) train kilometers includes both passenger and freight traffic and are 
the most representative of the number of train movement authorizations 
 
Reporting Period South Africa (SA) Australia (AUS) Great Britain (GB)
2013/14 121 180 290
2014/15 93 205 302
2015/16 94 205 282
Average: 102.7 196.7 291.3
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Table 1.4  Total Train Kilometers (Million) – SA, AUS, UK 
 
Source: Data for column 2 from RSR (2015, p. 5); RSR (2016, p. 21) 
Source: Data for column 3 from ONRSR (2016, p. 14) 
Source: Data for column 4 from ORR (2017a); ORR (2017b) 
 
Table 1.5  SPAD Incidents per million Train Kilometers (Normalised) – 
SA, AUS, UK 
 
Source: This data is based on calculations on data from Table 1.3 and Table 
1.4 
 
The data therefore indicates that, although SA can still improve 
substantially when compared with Great Britain, SPAD counts in SA are 
not disproportionately high when compared with other first world countries 
like Australia.  
 
Of the annual average number of SPAD incidents in South Africa, 57.2% 
are from TFR operations (Table 1.6). As TFR train kilometers on average 
represent 60.5% of the total registered for South African operators (Table 
1.1), TFR can be considered a very representative example of South 
African railway operations as a whole when studying SPADs.  
 
Reporting Period South Africa (SA) Australia (AUS) Great Britain (GB)
2013/14 76.3 118.2 552.6
2014/15 75.5 115.7 558.5
2015/16 67.7 155.3 556.7
Average: 73.2 129.7 555.9
Reporting Period South Africa (SA) Australia (AUS) Great Britain (GB)
2013/14 1.6 1.5 0.5
2014/15 1.2 1.8 0.5
2015/16 1.4 1.3 0.5
Average: 1.4 1.5 0.5
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Table 1.6  South African SPAD Incidents - Per Operator 
 
Source: RSR (2015, p. 14); RSR (2016, p. 26) 
Note that a report containing the per-operator breakdown of SPAD events 
was not published by the RSR for reporting period 2013/14. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Of the top five most costly incidents reported in 2014/15 (RSR, 2015), 
three were related to train handling and control issues (total associated 
damages of R93 million) with the most costly incident reported during 
2014/15 (RSR, 2015) directly attributed to a SPAD (Maputo train-on-train 
collision - R56 million). This demonstrates that whilst SPADs are not the 
most common incidents, the associated damages when they do occur can 
be quite high, presenting a significant risk. 
 
The Independent Transport Safety Regulator (ITSR) body within the New 
South Wales Government in Australia, concluded that the causes of 
SPADs generally include technical deficiencies associated with rolling 
stock or infrastructure but also driver error and violation (ITSR, 2011). 
Driver errors and violations typically include unsafe actions by the train 
crew such as the misreading of signal aspects, disregard for cautionary 
signals, incorrect braking technique, failure to communicate correctly and 
a range of external and internal distractions. The ITSR also includes 
organizational factors, such as poor safety culture, poorly designed 
procedures and inadequate monitoring or supervision, as contributors to 
such violations. This study, then, proposes, in the context of the failure of 
the train driver function, to investigate the application of operator 
automation as mitigation to SPAD incidents in the South African railway 
Reporting Period Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) Metrorail (PRASA) Other Total TFR %
2014/15 51 30 12 93 54.8
2015/16 56 31 7 94 59.6
Average: 53.5 30.5 9.5 93.5 57.2
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environment. TFR seems to be the most representative operator in the 
South African railway context as it has the largest network, is located in 
rural as well as suburban environments, carries both freight and 
passenger train traffic and shows a SPAD record proportional to that of 
South Africa as a whole. The study is therefore focussed around TFR 
specifically. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question that this study intends to answer is:  
 
What method of train driver function automation would be the most 
appropriate to mitigate SPADs in TFR railway operations? 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research project is: 
 
To determine the most appropriate method of train driver function 
automation to mitigate SPADs in TFR railway operations. 
 
This objective will be achieved by accomplishing the following: 
 
1.5.1 Conceptualization of TFR signalling methods and practices  
Building a conceptual framework for TFR signalling methods and practices 
with specific focus on how these are applied to effect train movements. 
This framework is to form the basis of train driver function models that are 
representative and practicable within TFR. The accuracy of this framework 
will be established by being reviewed by an experienced signalling 
engineer. 
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1.5.2 The definition of a current practice train driver function model 
Defining a train driver function model representative of the current 
practices on the TFR network. This model will be qualitative in nature and 
describe the method by which a train movement is authorised and effected 
with special emphasis on the role of the train driver in this process. 
 
1.5.3 Definition of a proposed ideal train driver function automation 
model 
Defining a proposed ideal automated train driver model. This model will be 
qualitative in nature and describe the methods by which a train movement 
is authorised and effected with special emphasis on the role of the 
automated train driver in this process. 
 
1.5.4 To test if the “proposed ideal” model satisfies the critical 
research question 
Testing the proposition that the proposed ideal model meets the 
requirements set out by the critical research question. The test will take 
the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with railway signalling 
engineers who have both TFR and industry subject matter expertise. 
 
1.6 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODS 
The study followed a qualitative research approach in the form of a 
modelling exercise based on the model development methodology 
formulated by Robinson (2004) and utilizing Functional Flow Block 
Diagrams. Semi-structured interviews were held with experienced 
signalling engineers who were required to generate models describing 
what they considered to be the most appropriate method of train driver 
function automation to mitigate SPADs within the TFR environment. 
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1.7 CONTRIBUTIONS 
South Africa specific railway signalling principles and practices are 
currently not well documented in technical literature such as engineering 
manuals. This study will contribute to the body of scientific knowledge by 
means of the conceptualization and modelling of how train movements are 
authorized and effected within the South African railway signalling 
environment.  
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS 
The study problem statement does not claim that train driver errors are the 
only or even the main cause of SPADs nor that train driver function 
automation is the only or the best mitigation against SPADs but that this 
specific mitigation method is the subject of this study. 
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
The research report is structured as follows: 
 
 Chapter 1 (Introduction) 
In chapter 1 an introduction to the research project or study is 
presented. It includes some background on the railway environment 
in South Africa, the problem to be investigated, the research 
question and hypothesis, study rationale and project limitations. 
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 Chapter 2 (Literature Review) 
In chapter 2 the literature relevant to the research project is 
reviewed. It includes an introduction to railway signalling concepts 
and practices, Human Factors research into the causes of SPADs, 
SPAD risk management strategies, train driver automation 
frameworks and the fundamental challenges presented to train 
driver automation. The chapter concludes with a discussion and 
listing of features that should be included in the proposed train 
driver function automation model. 
 
 Chapter 3 (Research Project Methodology) 
In chapter 3 the research project objectives and methodology for 
the study is presented and reviewed. It includes the research 
approach, measurement and data collection methods, model 
development as a research method, study validity and reliability as 
well as ethical considerations during data collection. 
 
 Chapter 4 (Results) 
In chapter 4 the results collected in the study are presented. It 
includes the conceptualization of signalling practices within TFR as 
well as the data collected during modelling interviews with signalling 
engineers. 
 
 Chapter 5 (Analysis) 
In chapter 5 an analysis is presented of the model data collected in 
the study and a generic train driver function automation model is 
proposed than can be considered the most appropriate in the TFR 
environment. The analysis includes the description and discussion 
of the commonalities and differences for both the Current Practice 
and Proposed Automation models as well as a motivation for the 
final selection of the model. 
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 Chapter 6 (Discussion) 
Chapter 6 will discuss how the project met its defined objectives in 
an effort to answer the research question. It includes a discussion 
on how the results compared with the literature, how project 
objectives were met, if the problem under investigation was solved 
and if the research question was effectively answered. 
 
 Chapter 7 (Conclusion and recommendations for further study) 
In chapter 7 the research conclusions are presented together with 
some recommendations for further study. 
  
26 
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter the literature relevant to the research project is reviewed.  It 
includes an introduction to railway signalling concepts and practices, a 
review of the research into the Human Factors (HF) in the causes of 
SPADs, SPAD risk management strategies, train driver automation 
frameworks and the fundamental challenges presented to train driver 
automation. The chapter concludes with a discussion and listing of 
features that should be included in the proposed train driver function 
automation model. 
 
2.1 RAILWAY SIGNALLING 
This section presents an overview of railway signalling concepts. Railway 
signalling is the technical discipline specifically responsible for safety in 
railway movements or the creation of safe capacity. It includes the 
philosophies, principles and methods used to assure safe and efficient 
railway movements as well as the systems used to implement these 
movements. 
 
Pachl (2009) stated there is no international standard relating to how 
railways are designed, signalled and operated. The modern conception of 
railways as trains pulled along metal guide rails by powerful mechanical 
engines, has been around since the early years of the 19th century and 
every country that has implemented this technology has, in time, 
developed their own principles and practices. There are three prominent 
operating philosophies that have influenced the railway operations 
worldwide: 
 
 British operating principles 
 German operating principles 
 North American operating principles 
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In South Africa’s case, the British school of operating principles has been 
more prominent in railway operations thinking with some influence from 
German interlocking systems The recent introduction of electronic 
interlocking systems on South African metro lines has marked a significant 
shift toward German interlocking philosophy and technology and has in 
some cases resulted in a temporary confusion in the meanings of certain 
signal aspects. 
 
To better understand what is required of railway signalling systems it is 
best to start with the two identifying features of railway systems as 
presented by Trinckauf (2009): 
 
i. Firstly, that the path taken by a train is determined by the 
mechanical guidance system of wheel and rail, and this can be 
changed only at points sets (railway intersections), that trains can 
only pass each other at specially created crossing locations (at 
crossing loops for example) and that the paths that trains follow 
should therefore be predetermined and setup as part of rail traffic 
control. Due to this reality, including the fact that the railway vehicle 
(train) and the guidance system (wheel-track and points) are so 
tightly connected, rail traffic control can be considered a linear 
control problem. 
 
ii. Secondly, that the relatively poor braking ability or response of steel 
wheel on steel rail, while maintaining typical line speeds of 50 to 70 
km/h, results in a situation where the braking distance for a train 
typically exceeds the viewing range of the driver. This requires that 
driver sight on the route should be supplemented by safety systems 
and precautions to warn the driver in good time about when a 
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speed reduction or a complete train stop may be required on the 
route ahead. 
 
Such types of technical challenges have led to the development of the 
discipline of railway signalling and control, including philosophies, 
processes and technologies. 
 
2.1.1 Railway Signalling and Control 
The objectives and tasks of signalling and control can be defined as 
follows (Trinckauf, 2009; Connor, 2017): 
 
Operation control system: The operation control system ensures optimal 
control of the sequences and processes in the 
traffic system. 
 
Signalling system: To ensure the safe control of transport 
processes with the safety aspect stressed. 
 
The high degree of commonality in the functions and facilitating 
technologies of these systems has led to them being combined into the 
signalling systems known today. Modern signalling systems can therefore 
be considered as systems facilitating operation control while enforcing 
certain safety precautions. Figure 2.1 is a representation of a modern 
railway signalling and control system. 
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Figure 2.1  Modern Railway Signalling and Control System 
Source: Adapted from Trinckauf (2009, p. 19) 
 
Operational control objectives are translated into routes, schedules and 
train movements understandable to the signalling system. Based on a 
given route definition, the track elements in the route are identified, re-
aligned where needed and verified as available and ready for train 
passage. The train is then given proceed instructions (movement 
authorities) including speed indications while its passage through the route 
is tracked. Track elements are typically monitored and controlled by track-
side detection devices and actuators. Train movement authorities and 
speed controls are communicated to the locomotive operator or driver of 
the train, whose responsibility is to control the train along the route. These 
authorities can be communicated via track side signalling mechanisms or 
train-cab based display terminals. 
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Trinckauf’s (2009) Functional structure of the railway control system will be 
used as a basis for the conceptualisation of TFR signalling methods and 
practices in chapter 4, elaborated on below. 
 
Field Element Level 
Trinckauf (2009) presents the basic field elements related to signalling 
systems to include points-sets (or “points”), signals and tracks. More 
specialized elements do exist but discussion thereof will be considered 
outside of the scope of this conceptualization. 
 
Points are one of the most basic moveable track elements. The purpose of 
points is to provide connections between intersecting or crossing tracks 
(Lykov & Theeg, 2009). The physical structure of points are similar in 
almost all railways. Essentially they consist of a pair of blade-like objects, 
appropriately referred to as “points blades”, that can be switched to either 
of two positions (See Figure 2.2). 
 
Points
Blades
Points
Blades
 
Figure 2.2  Function of Points Sets 
Source: Adapted from Lykov & Theeg (2009, p. 150) 
 
As indicated in Figure 2.2, points can either lie for the straight, guiding the 
train to proceed in the straight direction, or for the turn-out, guiding the 
train to turn off the straight and onto the alternative or turn-out path. Points 
31 
 
 
are typically thrown from one position to the other by means of 
mechanical, electrical or hydraulic points machines. 
 
The purpose of signals is to convey information and instructions to the 
train driver (Theeg, 2009). These signals are similar in physical 
appearance to the traffic lights used to coordinate traffic on road networks. 
Signals can take many forms, for example man-operated flag movements, 
track-side mechanical arms or computer displays inside the train cab. 
 
For signalling purposes, the railway line is divided into logical sections 
(Pachl, 2009) called track sections or simply referred to as “tracks”. These 
physical tracks are continuously monitored as either being vacant or 
occupied by railway vehicles. This is used as an indication of the train 
location or position (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2009a). It should be noted that 
track detection equipment can technically only verify tracks as being 
vacant. A “not vacant” status implies that the track is either occupied or 
that a technical failure has occurred. 
 
Control Unit Level 
The purpose of element monitoring and control units is to interface field 
elements to the interlocking and greater signalling system. From here, the 
components of the field elements are triggered and monitored with regards 
to their current operating state (Trinckauf, 2009). 
  
Operations Control Level  
The Train Control Officer (TCO) is the person who initiates the train 
movement. Although operational planning, time tables and the current 
operational situation should be taken into account when making their 
decisions, TCO’s have an element of discretion at their disposal. The ease 
or effectiveness of this operation would be impacted by the type of system 
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used and the technical generation of information by the system (Trinckauf, 
2009).  
 
Interlocking Level 
The interlocking layer is a safety layer inserted between the TCO on the 
operations control level and the trains and field elements on the field 
element layer. The purpose of the interlocking is to transform or filter TCO 
inputs to exclude unsafe actions like the initiation of conflicting routes, 
changes to a route while the train is traversing it, or the authorisation of a 
train to proceed when it is not safe to do so (Trinckauf, 2009; Connor, 
2017). 
 
2.1.2 Signalling for Railway Operation 
Due to the application of steel wheels on steel rails, the braking ability of a 
train is typically eight times less than for road going vehicles. The resulting 
extension in braking distance would place a severe restriction on 
operational speeds (15 to 30 km/h) if train drivers were to space trains 
based on their viewing range. For regular train movements, procedures of 
train separation are therefore required that work independently from the 
viewing range of the driver (Pachl, 2009). The most common train 
separation methods include Signalled Fixed Block Operation and Cab 
Signal Operation. Pachl (2009) defines Fixed Block Operation as a system 
where trains are separated by a fixed block distance. The track is divided 
into fixed block sections and a given block should be occupied by only one 
train (Connor, 2017). In a Signalled Fixed Block Operation, access to 
block sections are limited by signals, which provide movement authority to 
enter that block section (illustrated in Figure 4.4).  
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Pachl (2009) and Connor (2017) list the following conditions as having to 
be fulfilled before a signal can be cleared and a train authorized into a 
block section: 
 
 The train ahead must have cleared the block section. 
 The train ahead must have cleared the safety overlap behind the 
next signal. Overlaps are discussed later in the paragraph on 
interlocking principles. Also see Figure 2.4. 
 The train ahead must be protected from following train movements 
by a stop signal. 
 The train must be protected against opposing movements. 
 
A Cab Signalled Operation is so called due to the fact that the role of line 
side signals are fulfilled by a computer terminal located inside the train cab 
(Pachl, 2009). This form of signalling has many advantages including the 
improved ability to communicate movement authorities to the driver. 
Whereas on a line side colour light signalled line, the driver is required to 
observe the signal in the moment and decode the meaning of the 
configuration of the signal lamps.  The cab terminal can provide the driver 
with continuous information on movement authorities, optimal speed 
profiles and other operational notices. Cab signalling can take many forms 
- from simple auxiliary systems used to augment existing lineside signals 
to the more advanced systems where most of the interlocking is train 
borne, requiring very little line side infrastructure. 
 
Cab signalling technology further enables the method of train separation 
by “Moving Block” (Pachl, 2009). This is where a virtual block is kept 
between trains based on the train’s actual braking characteristics 
(illustrated in Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3  Moving Block Operation 
 
Some railway lines with a very low density of traffic are operated without 
any signalling system. This is sometimes referred to as “dark territory 
signalling” (Pachl, 2009). The movement authorities are issued to the train 
drivers by the TCO in verbal form using radio or telephone. The authority 
only takes effect after it has been repeated and thereby verified by the 
TCO. It is the responsibility of train crews to give information to the TCO 
about the actual location of the train at certain intervals (Pachl, 2009). 
 
On un-signalled lines, operational control can also be governed by a Track 
Warrant System (TWS). Trains may occupy tracks only on the basis of the 
possession of a ‘track warrant’ covering a precisely defined track segment 
of a given length (Pachl, 2009). The limit of movement authority may be 
any point designated in the track warrant, but is often designated at the 
next meeting point. In the most simple of such systems, the TCO relies 
completely on a handwritten train sheet but in more advanced systems the 
TCO enters a movement authority into a computer based control system 
before issuance to the driver. The control system evaluates the entry and 
rejects any overlapping or conflicting authorities, protecting the TCO from 
issuing potentially unsafe movement authorities (Pachl, 2009). 
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Signals and Signal Aspects 
The application and interpretation of traffic signals are very specific to the 
country and railway in which they are implemented. TFR specific signals 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 
Interlocking Principles 
Interlocking is the central function that ensures trains move safely in 
technical terms. To achieve this, the interlocking obtains information about 
track occupation by railway vehicles and the position of moveable track 
elements (refer to Figure 2.1). It then evaluates this information and 
permits movements via the signals.  
 
The process of using interlocking systems in the application of protected 
train paths can be described as the definition of “Protected routes & 
Overlaps”. 
 
Routes are logically defined as from a given signal (departure signal) to 
the next signal in the same direction or destination signal (Theeg et al., 
2009), illustrated in Figure 2.4. The route is then augmented by a relatively 
short section of track on the other side of the destination signal called an 
overlap (Theeg et al., 2009; Connor, 2017). This overlap acts as a form of 
safety margin for when the train driver, due to small misjudgements, might 
overshoot the stop signal. The typical length of an overlap is much less 
than the braking distance of a train and is not intended to allow a train to 
only start braking at the destination stop signal. Routes can be extended 
by adding any number of follow-on routes although they always terminate 
in an overlap (refer to Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4  Routes and Overlaps 
Source: Adapted from Theeg et al. (2009, p. 68) 
 
Theeg et al. (2009) presents the typical safety functions performed by the 
signalling system for the protected route and overlap as: 
 
 Prevention of a derailment on non-continuous guideway locations. 
Note that moveable track elements have to be in their proper 
position. 
 
 Prevention of a derailment on the continuous guideway by choice of 
the proper speed according to the line geometry and the radii at 
divergences. 
 
 Protection from following, opposing and flank movements. 
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 Protection against human errors such as overruns of Stop signals, 
also known as SPADs (only applies to ATP and similar systems – 
not the current practice within TFR). 
 
The process of route setup, maintenance and ultimate release can also be 
called the lifecycle of a route. Theeg et al. (2009) presents this lifecycle to 
typically follow the following steps or stages: 
 
i. Route calling 
This is the initial step of a two-step operation performed by the 
TCO. The route calling command (departure and destination signal-
set) is typically entered via a computer terminal located in the 
Centralised Traffic Control (CTC) office and communicated to the 
relevant interlocking system via a remote control network. 
 
ii. Route checking 
The interlocking verifies that the route is indeed available and that 
no conflicting routes have been setup. In the case of the route 
being unavailable, the route call is ignored. 
 
iii. Commanding of moveable track elements 
All moveable track elements (for example points-sets) are adjusted 
to conform to the designed route configuration. 
 
iv. Route locking 
All elements forming part of the route are locked into position and 
reserved until released. 
 
v. Checking of the clear or vacant status of the tracks 
All tracks that form part of the route are verified as being vacant. 
This includes the overlap track. 
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vi. Signal selection and control 
After the route has successfully been initialised, the signal can be 
cleared (set to proceed) by the TCO. The interlocking determines 
the appropriate signal aspect to display, depending on the route 
layout. 
 
vii. Route supervision 
During the whole time that the route is active and the entry signal 
cleared, the route is monitored for any changes in condition that 
affect the safety integrity of the route. Such conditions may include 
the failure of a signal lamp filament, the breaking in points-blade 
detection or the detection of a vehicle or obstacle on the track. If 
such an unsafe condition is detected, the entry signal is 
immediately put back to Stop. 
 
viii. Signal returning to Stop 
As the train passes the entry signal, the signal is put back to stop to 
protect the route and the occupying train from following 
movements. 
 
ix. Route release 
As the train traverses the route, the elements behind the train are 
released and made available for other route calls. This process, as 
the interlocking elements revert to its default or “available” 
condition, is also known as route “normalization”. 
 
2.2 THE CAUSES OF SPADS 
Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) are defined as incidents where a train 
passes a signal displaying a stop indication or stop aspect, i.e. a red 
signal, without authorisation (ITSR, 2011). A report by the Independent 
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Transport Safety Regulator (ITSR) within the New South Wales 
Government in Australia, states that the causes of SPADs generally 
include technical deficiencies associated with rolling stock or infrastructure 
but also driver error and violation (ITSR, 2011).  Driver errors and 
violations typically include unsafe actions by the train crew, such as the 
misreading of signal aspects, disregarding of cautionary signals, incorrect 
braking technique, failure to communicate correctly and a range of 
external and internal distractions. The ITSR also include organizational 
factors that contribute to violations, such as poor safety culture, poorly 
designed procedures and inadequate monitoring or supervision of train 
drivers and train control officers (ITSR, 2011). 
 
Driver distraction and errors in sustained attention, has been identified as 
leading causes of driver error related SPADs (Edkins & Pollock, 1997; 
Naweed, 2013a; Naweed, 2013b). These errors typically fall into both the 
categories of commission (inattentive driver going through a stop signal for 
example) and omission (late application of the brakes for example). These 
distractions can manifest from internal or external sources and can be task 
related or unrelated. Naweed (2013a, 2013b) listed the primary factors 
driving the risk for SPADs in order of importance as:  
 
1. Time-keeping pressure 
Time pressure has proven to be the dominating factor in driver error 
SPAD risk. The goals of keeping time and driving safely can be 
considered conflicting or pulling against each other. Driving 
carefully and safely when the drivers know they are behind 
schedule tends to generate an internal distraction that leads to the 
loss of focus on their route knowledge such as a signal around the 
next bend and the anticipated aspect of the signal. 
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2. Station dwelling 
In this scenario the driver pulls away from the station platform as 
soon as the doors are closed and the staff announce that the train 
is ready to leave but they do this without a signal to proceed. Time 
pressure can be an exacerbating factor. 
 
3. Sighting restrictions 
These scenarios represent the misreading of a signal and are 
typically primed or exacerbated by time pressure or delays during 
station dwelling. A driver of a train on one of two parallel lines 
would, for example, read the aspect from the signal of the adjacent 
line instead of his own. 
 
2.3 STRATEGIES AND COUNTERMEASURES IN SPAD RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
In their discussion on the requirements, classification and conditions for 
the application of train protection and control systems, Theeg & Vlasenko 
(2009) describe their functions as falling into three categories: 
 
 Cab signalling functions 
These functions constitute driver warnings and information displays 
located in the train cab and typically include audible signal 
warnings, visual repetition of track side signals and dynamic speed 
information. 
 
 Supervision functions 
These functions constitute the monitoring of train conditions and 
driver behaviour that typically include checks in driver ability, 
attentiveness and compliance with speed limits. 
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 Intervention functions 
These functions constitute automatic interventions that typically 
include forced-response driver warnings, disabling of traction power 
and the application of train service or emergency brakes, to slow 
the train or bring it to a complete standstill. 
 
Theeg & Vlasenko (2009) classify the particular train protection systems 
applied within railways into broad categories based on their functions and 
types of transmission. These systems are reviewed quite comprehensively 
in their chapter on Train Protection (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2009) but such a 
review falls outside of the scope of this study. 
 
Naweed et al. (2015) defined the two general categories of formal 
countermeasures and informal strategies to mitigate SPAD risk in train 
driving. Formal countermeasures typically include forced-response 
devices that promote driver awareness to SPAD risk (Automatic Warning 
System or AWS for example) as well as automatic intervention systems 
(Automatic Train Protection or ATP for example). 
 
Informal strategies focus on the driver’s intention to drive safely. These 
strategies are created by the drivers themselves to aid them in safely 
executing their duties – an exercise that can in and of itself be considered 
safety awareness or safety culture. According to Naweed et al. (2015), 
these strategies became more important as systems like the AWS and 
ATP which increasingly not used as intended. Some drivers reported that 
they sometimes turn down the volume of the AWS system, considering it a 
distraction, even though such an action was against policy. Others 
reported using the ATP system as a general method of monitoring speed 
and not as a safety warning device. 
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The strategies identified were grouped as specifically applying to the 
context of service delivery or the context of the driver-signal dynamic: 
 
 Assessment strategies 
Two strategies identified in this category are focused on the driver’s 
own assessment of the train he is driving and the driver monitoring 
of his own fitness to drive safely (Naweed et al., 2015). The first 
entails the personal assessment by the driver of the state of the 
train he is driving. This would include knowledge of potential 
mechanical issues such as braking dynamics that may affect train 
handling.  The second strategy entails the driver’s honest self-
monitoring of his levels of emotional distraction and fatigue and 
reporting concerns about his fitness to drive prior to starting his 
shift. 
 
 Task-prioritization strategies 
Task prioritization strategies include the conscious decision to focus 
on tasks considered imperative to safe driving and dismiss 
competing tasks (Naweed et al., 2015).  A typical example would be 
ignoring an incoming call from the controller whilst navigating a 
difficult section in the route. When confronted with time table 
pressure, experienced drivers would consciously prioritize safety. 
 
 Automatic-attention strategies 
These strategies are built around cognitive processes and 
awareness strategies to assist divers in automatically registering 
signals and changes in signals (Naweed et al., 2015). A typical 
example would be when a driver observed a signal switching from 
clear to caution, and that driver would then “turn on a switch” 
(Naweed et al., 2015, p. 890) in his head helping him to focus on 
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the signal state and changes in that state. This becomes that much 
more important in demanding situations. 
 
 Behavioural strategies 
These strategies include token actions that drivers devised as aids 
to help them overcome sighting restrictions, retain signal 
awareness and act as reminders during station dwells (Naweed et 
al., 2015). Such actions include consciously setting the direction 
switch to the neutral position during station dwells, or physically 
standing up in the cab when a caution signal is encountered. 
 
To apply operator automation as mitigation in SPAD incidents in a South 
African railway context, this research will examine the following areas of 
literature pertaining to train driver automation 
 
2.4 TRAIN DRIVER AUTOMATION – A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In their discussion on the automation of train operation, Theeg & Vlasenko 
(2009b) present a framework for train driver automation based on discrete 
steps or levels of increased automation. For reference purposes, these 
levels have been numbered from the least amount of automation to the 
most. 
 
Level 0 Manual driving without any automation 
The driver is fully responsible for driving and there is no train 
protection system present. 
 
Level 1 Manual driving with technical supervision 
A Train protection system supervising the driver and 
enforcing safety in case of driver error. 
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Level 2 Partially automatic operation 
Train driving tasks and responsibilities are divided between 
the train protection system and the driver. The train 
protection system is fully responsible for some tasks and the 
driver is fully responsible for the others. 
 
Level 3 Automatic driving with human supervision 
The train is normally driven automatically with the driver 
observing and intervening in case of danger or technical 
failure. 
 
Level 4 Full automation 
The train is normally driven automatically with no supervision 
from a human driver.  In some cases a person that is 
normally charged with other responsibilities like ticket 
collecting, may be available to take control if needed. 
 
Examples of fully automatic driving can be found on some single metro 
lines in Paris, Lille, Vancouver and Copenhagen as well as on special 
purpose applications such as airport shuttle trains (Theeg & Vlasenko, 
2009b). 
 
Georgescu (2006) has presented the following alternative framework or 
hierarchy of automated train control: 
 
 Semi-automated Train Operation (STO) 
A driver, in the cab, is only responsible for safe departure from 
stations while the train drives automatically between stations. The 
driver should also monitor and take control in hazardous situations. 
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 Driverless Train Operation (DTO) 
No driver is required in the cab or to observe. Operational staff may 
be on board to assist with other tasks such as door closing. 
 
 Unmanned Train Operation (UTO) 
No driver or operations staff on board.  All functions are performed 
automatically and supervised remotely. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the framework presented by Theeg & 
Vlasenko (2009b) is considered preferable because it presents a more 
linear progression from total manual control to total automatic control 
whilst elaborating more on the available options within the STO category. 
UTO, is not directly addressed by Theeg & Vlasenko (2009b), but can be 
considered a special case within the full automation category. 
 
This framework does not take into account what is referred to as the 
“proliferation of gadgets” – the simple and unthoughtful addition of a 
multitude of buttons, sirens, flashing lights and other countermeasures to 
the train cab. Such measures often prove more disruptive than helpful to 
the driver in the execution of his duties. This framework presents a simple 
and theoretically elegant approach to operator automation design in 
general. 
 
2.5 FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES TO OPERATOR AUTOMATION 
There are fundamental challenges or practical limitations to the concept of 
operator automation that should also be considered. These include certain 
ironic circumstances that have to be confronted when considering operator 
(train driver) automation as well the additional roles that train drivers fulfil 
above that of train control. 
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2.5.1 The Ironies of Automation  
Bainbridge (1983), a seminal author on the topic of operator automation, 
discusses the ironies faced by the system designer who wants to eliminate 
the operator from a control system due to his perceived unreliability or 
inefficiency. Due to the fundamental challenges humans pose to the 
enterprise of operator automation it is a worthwhile exercise to review 
Bainbridge’s “ironies” more comprehensively below. 
 
Firstly, Bainbridge (1983) considered it ironic that this same designer 
cannot control the errors that he himself introduces into the design of the 
automatic control system (designer unreliability).  The second irony is that 
the operator tends to end up with an arbitrary set of tasks that could not be 
easily or practically automated but that are also not really suited to the 
abilities of the operator (designer inefficiency). These tasks can generally 
be reduced to the categories of monitoring of the automatic system for 
correct operation and the intervention or “taking control” in the case of 
actual system failure. 
 
Required knowledge for effective process control 
Bainbridge (1983) suggested that if an operator is required to take control 
of a process and stabilise it, a certain measure of manual control skill is 
required. The same goes for fault diagnosis underpinning judgements on 
process shut down or recovery actions. Such judgements and actions 
require a certain measure of cognitive skill. 
 
Bainbridge (1983) continued by stating that the manual control skills 
required to control a complex process can take a long time to master and 
deteriorate fairly quickly if not practiced regularly. This is evidenced by the 
fact that experienced operators tend to make step changes or transitions 
more smoothly, quickly and with fewer actions than less experienced 
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operators. More experienced operators tend to demonstrate an insight or 
intuition into what the effects of their actions will be. Contrary to this, 
inexperienced operators rely more on feedback and correction – a process 
that can be slow and result in a lot of oscillation or “back and forth” action. 
At the same time it will be more difficult for an inexperienced operator to 
be able to judge if the feedback received is the result of poor driving or 
system failure and if system failure has been diagnosed, it may require a 
very skilled operator to take over to cope without relying on the system. 
Train driving can be considered a good example of such a complex 
process. The driver has to adjust and control the speed of the train – a 
vehicle that has a lot of inertia and is therefore relatively unresponsive to 
his control actions. At the same time, the driver has to adjust for changing 
speed restrictions, keep to a strict time table, drive economically and avoid 
hazards. 
 
Bainbridge (1983) continued by stating that the cognitive skills required, 
can be categorized into categories of “long-term knowledge” and “working 
storage”. Long-term knowledge represents the methods and strategies 
developed over time, while engaged in the control of a process. These 
methods and strategies are developed during the long run performance of 
control actions, considering the feedback and retaining what works and 
works well while rejecting those methods that work less well or not well at 
all. Unfortunately, this knowledge cannot be acquired without practice and 
deteriorates if not practiced. Work storage represents knowledge about 
the current state and behaviour of the process on a given day. This 
knowledge is similar to adjusting to the look, feel and responsiveness of a 
rental car you have not driven before where it takes one a few minutes of 
driving to master its dynamics. A train driver may have to adjust to driving 
a different kind of train or a train with a different makeup affecting the 
handling. There may be workmen on the track this week or line of sight 
may be affected by the weather resulting in the driver adjusting his 
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approach to driving. This kind of knowledge will not be available to the 
operator when control has to be taken in the moment of need. 
 
Monitoring and operator attitudes 
Bainbridge (1983) also suggests that before relegating the role of the 
operator to that of only monitoring an automated process, it should be 
remembered that the operator was to be replaced by the automatic system 
because he was perceived to be inferior at the control task to that very 
automatic system. Now the operator will be required to only monitor and 
judge if the automatic system is working effectively. The irony of the 
situation is again evident when considering the monitor has to remain 
vigilant for an abnormality or failure event that rarely occurs. Owing to the 
fact that human operators are not always competent at this, they tend to 
rely on the alarm system to highlight abnormalities. This prompts us to 
ask: Is the alarm system working correctly and how should the monitor 
detect alarm system failure? This seems to be an impossible task. 
 
It is also important to consider the impact the job of monitoring has on the 
operator’s attitude. It can easily seem like a job requiring very little skill but 
a lot of responsibility. It has been shown that such circumstances are 
conducive to low job satisfaction, high stress, poor health and can also 
lead to increased error rates. 
 
Solutions and recommendations 
As is evidenced by the examples above, the problems associated with 
operator automation can seem like a paradox as the only way to properly 
automate a process would require the human operator to remain in 
control. Despite the difficulty, Bainbridge (1983) did attempt to make some 
recommendations for designers of automatic control systems.  These 
included the use of realistic simulators or manual driving periods to keep 
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the operator’s driving skills in practice and other information interfaces that 
may help the monitor to evaluate the decision making process as 
executed by the automatic system. 
 
It is significant to discover find that a more recent review of Bainbridge 
(1983) by Rooksby et al. (2012) has found that examples of these ironies 
are still prevalent and that such fundamental ironies can be expected to 
persist for some time to come. 
 
2.5.2 Hidden roles of the Train Driver 
In their study on the challenges presented in the full automation of the 
Helsinki Metro, Karvonen et al. (2011) have made the point that there is 
more to the train driver than basic train control. The case is presented that 
when the Helsinki Metro operation is considered as a whole, the driver is 
responsible for operating the train, taking care of passengers, observing 
events outside the train and acting positively in exceptional situations. 
 
Driving the train 
Karvonen et al. (2011) proposed that the driver’s position in the train cab 
provides him with a direct view of the track, stations, platforms and 
passengers while operating the train. This places him in a unique position 
to anticipate, observe, interpret and react to events in that environment. 
Some of these events may require a speedy reaction such as when an 
obstacle is observed on the track ahead or when intruders or vandals are 
detected inside the security fence – observations and reactions that may 
prove difficult if performed from a remote location. 
 
Passenger care 
Karvonen et al. (2011) also proposed there are certain tasks that are fairly 
trivial for a human being to perform but that can be extremely difficult for 
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an automatic system to perform. When considering the design of safety 
critical systems, it should be remembered that computers excel only at 
repetitive, basic tasks, and not at complex problem solving. A typical 
example of this limitation is passenger care. Passengers are independent 
actors whose actions may be unpredictable. A human train driver, 
therefore has a natural interface with human passengers. 
 
In the case of emergency, be it a medical condition of a passenger, train 
accident, or a fire, the presence of a human driver on site to calm other 
passengers, assist with orderly and speedy evacuation and to coordinate 
with emergency services is incomparable. In general, the train driver can 
act as the on-site representative of the railway company for passengers, 
clients or emergency services when the need arises. 
 
Interactions with other actors of the metro system 
Lastly, Karvonen et al. (2011) proposed that the train driver also acts as 
an important link with other actors in the metro system such as the traffic 
controllers, security guards and maintenance personnel. His actions may 
include reporting of potential hazards, security risks and technical failures. 
The driver is also near at hand to fix small technical faults such as train 
door faults that can bring the whole operation to a stand-still if an 
unmanned model was pursued. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS 
This section summarises the key concepts for train driver automation that 
could be gathered from a review of the literature. The concepts will be 
presented through the different levels of automation, starting with the 
highest level, and evaluating if it should be eliminated or disqualified as a 
viable option. 
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2.6.1 Level 4 – Full automation 
At first glance, full automation seems to deliver on all of the perceived 
advantages of train driver automation. These include:  
 
 Increased safety in the mitigation of driver induced SPADs 
(Naweed et al. (2015). 
 
 Increased cost effectiveness due to reduction in personnel 
requirements and more efficient driving profiles under computer 
control (Karvonen et al., 2011). 
 
 Enablement of higher traffic rates and operational flexibility 
(Karvonen et al., 2011). 
 
Yet, difficulties are soon revealed when the train control function is 
considered within the greater context of the railway operation, and 
operating in the real world. This perspective can be considered as the 
systems level or system engineer’s view. It may not be that difficult to 
automate train control, but to automate the train driver may not prove as 
simple. Consider the following: 
 
 When the inevitable technical failure does occur, what fall-back 
modes and recovery mechanisms can be put in place to maintain 
safety and not bring the whole operation to a stand-still? In such 
cases a ready and able human train driver is inevitably required to 
monitor the system for correct operation and take control when 
needed (Bainbridge, 1983) like in automation level 3 (automatic 
driving with human supervision). 
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 Increased automation may not lead to a reduction in staff.  A 
reduction in train drivers due to automation may only lead to 
increased requirements in support and supervisory staff and more 
sophisticated levels of training (Karvonen et al., 2011). 
 
 There are certain functions that may be quite trivial for a human 
train driver to perform but almost impossible to automate.  These 
include the ability of a human train driver to observe potential 
hazards and react to those hazards, passenger care under normal 
and emergency circumstances, debugging of small technical 
failures such as door problems and a whole range of interactions 
with operations and maintenance staff (Karvonen et al., 2011). 
 
On the basis of these criticisms, automation Level 4 (full automation) will 
not be considered. 
 
2.6.2 Level 3 – Automatic driving with human supervision 
Automatic driving with human supervision effectively counters most of the 
defects introduced with full automation but it is confronted by another kind 
of problem – that of having a fully capable human driver at hand to monitor 
and intervene when necessary. Bainbridge (1983) asserted that: 
 
 The manual control skills and cognitive skills required for train 
control will soon deteriorate in a driver if not practiced regularly. 
 
 A driver whose responsibility has been relegated to monitoring the 
driving performance of a machine whose driving skills are perceived 
to be superior to his own may not be the right person for the job.  
He may also not have enough insight into the decision making 
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process to judge when things are going wrong and require 
intervention. 
 
 A driver assigned to monitor an automatic system may very well 
feel that his job requires little skill, that he has very little insight and 
control of what is happening, yet is held responsible for the 
outcomes.  These working conditions have shown to lead to high 
levels of stress and unhappiness and increased error rates. 
 
On the basis of these criticisms, automation Level 3 (automatic driving 
with human supervision) will not be considered. 
 
2.6.3 Level 2 – Partially automatic operation 
Level 2 automation does not seem to counter the criticisms of Level 3 
(automatic driving with human supervision) and will therefore not be 
considered. 
 
2.6.4 Level 1 – Manual driving with technical supervision 
Manual driving with technical supervision seems to be the most practical 
option for the following reasons: 
 
 The driver is maintained in his traditional role mitigating most of the 
fundamental criticisms to automatic drivers faced by levels two, 
three and four. 
 
 In addition, the technical supervision system can be scaled to cover 
only the functions critical to safety and can therefore be much less 
sophisticated and less expensive than a fully functional automatic 
driver.  
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 Lastly, the technical supervision system can simply be 
superimposed over the current manual driving model and the 
implementation will therefore result in minimum disruption to 
ongoing operations.  
 
2.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION 
The following recommendations for the development of the proposed ideal 
model emerged from the review of the literature:  
 
Firstly, Level 1 automation (manual driving with technical supervision) is 
the recommended automation model to be implemented. It should be 
noted that, to improve the practicability of the new model in the TFR 
railway environment, the model should be based on the current signalling 
and operational practices within TFR. 
 
Secondly, the formal countermeasures and informal strategies presented 
by Naweed et al. (2015) align reasonably well with the two elements of 
probability and criticality that make up the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) concept of risk (BSI, 1999). 
The informal strategies and vigilance improvement systems attempt to 
reduce driver error rates while intervention systems minimise the effects if 
driver errors were made. Although it is desirable to try and reduce the 
probability of train driver error, the methods seem to be somewhat open-
ended as they cannot enforce safety. It does not mean that such methods 
are ineffective and should not be investigated or implemented or that 
intervention systems are not subject to failure (Edkins & Pollock, 1997; 
Scott & Gibson, 2012 cited in Naweed et al., 2015) but it can be argued 
that the vigilance improvement systems do not present a solid foundation 
for safety control (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2009; Kyriakidis, Hirsch & 
Majumdar, 2012). Reduction in the adverse consequences seems to be 
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the most appropriate and accessible approach in this case as it closes the 
loop in terms of safety enforcement (the result is forced) and is based on 
technologies that are well established and well understood. These 
systems (Automatic Train Protection and others for example) are based on 
the monitoring of the human driver and enforcing safety by applying the 
brakes if the driver significantly exceeds the required speed restrictions or 
movement authorities (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2009). In many ways such an 
approach constitutes having all of the advantages of a human train driver, 
which has been shown to be considerable (Bainbridge, 1983; Karvonen et 
al., 2011), whilst mitigating the disadvantages. It is therefore 
recommended the new model approach be along similar lines to ATP 
systems. 
 
Thirdly, it may be worthwhile to consider adding functions that aid the 
driver in better driving but such functions should not form the basis of 
safety. 
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3 RESEARCH PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents and discusses the research methodology followed 
in the design and execution of this study. This includes the research 
approach, objectives and design as well as data collection and analysis 
methods. A discussion on the validity, reliability and ethics of the study are 
also included. The chapter concludes with a summary diagram of the 
resulting research project lifecycle. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This study investigates the human train driver associated causes of 
SPADs, proposing to develop and present a hypothetical automation 
model for the train driver function that can effectively mitigate SPADs and 
that can be considered as the most appropriate within TFR railway 
operations. The nature of the data to be collected therefore recommended 
a qualitative research approach.  
 
Qualitative research is interpretative and aims to provide a depth of 
understanding (Dudovskiy, 2011). Qualitative methods are typically based 
on words, perceptions and feelings rather than numbers and typically 
includes experiments, interviews and questionnaires with open-ended 
questions (Dudovskiy, 2011). Such methods consider real-world 
phenomena while capturing and studying the complexity of these 
phenomena (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). This is in contrast to quantitative 
research which is presented by Dudovskiy (2011) as describing and 
measuring the level of occurrences on the basis of numbers and 
calculations, typically asking questions like How many? or How often?  
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A qualitative research approach may present several advantages but also 
present certain challenges. Leedy & Ormrod (2015) present the following 
typical advantages of a qualitative approach: 
 
 Exploration: It can help you gain initial insights into what has 
previously been a little-studied topic 
 
 Multifaceted description: It can reveal the complex nature of certain 
situations, processes, relationships and systems. 
 
 Verification: It can allow you to test the validity of certain 
assumptions, theories or generalizations within real-world contexts. 
 
 Theory development: It can enable you to develop new concepts or 
theoretical perspectives related to a phenomenon. 
 
 Problem identification: It can help you uncover key problems, 
obstacles or enigmas that exist within the phenomenon. 
 
 Evaluation: It can provide a means through which you can judge the 
effectiveness of particular policies, practices or innovations. 
 
Leedy & Ormrod (2015) also describes some of the disadvantages or 
challenges introduced by a qualitative research approach: 
 
 That, as a general rule, it does not allow you to conclusively identify 
cause-and-effect relationships (questions such as “what caused 
what?” or why such-and-such happened?). 
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 In cases where the research questions are especially open-ended, 
it may be difficult to identify the exact methods to be used. For this 
reason, the researcher may have to adapt his methods as data 
comes in. 
 
As the purpose of this study was to develop a proposed ideal model of 
train driver automation that represents an improvement on the current-
practice manual driving model and to verify this model as the most 
appropriate for TFR railway operations, a qualitative research approach 
was deemed preferable. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The following objectives were defined for this research project: 
 
3.2.1 Conceptualization of TFR signalling methods and practices  
This objective entailed the building of a conceptual framework of TFR 
signalling methods and practices, with specific focus on how these are 
applied to effect train movements. This framework was to form the basis 
for the creation of train driver function models that are representative of 
and practicable within TFR. The validity of this framework was established 
by being reviewed by a signalling engineer with extensive experience 
within the TFR signalling environment. 
 
3.2.2 Establishment of the current practice train driver function 
model 
This objective entailed the establishment of the train driver function model 
representative of the current practise on the TFR network. This model is 
qualitative in nature, and describes the method by which a train movement 
is authorised and effected with special emphasis on the role of the train 
driver in this process. 
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3.2.3 Definition of a “proposed ideal” train driver function automation 
model 
This objective entailed the definition of a proposed ideal automated train 
driver model. This model is qualitative in nature, describes the methods by 
which a train movement is authorised and effected with special emphasis 
on role of the automated train driver in this process. 
 
3.2.4 To test if the proposed ideal model satisfies the critical research 
question 
This objective entailed the testing of the proposition that the proposed 
ideal model meets the requirements set out by the critical research 
question. The test took the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with railway signalling engineers who have both TFR and industry subject 
matter expertise. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Saunders et al. (2009) define the research design as the general plan the 
researcher will follow in order to answer the research question(s). This 
process can also be described as turning the research question into a 
research project (Robson, 2002). As the study followed a model 
development process, the design description for this research project will 
include pre-modelling conceptualization as well as model development 
concepts, process and language.  
 
3.3.1 Pre-modelling conceptualization 
The purpose of pre-modelling conceptualization is to establish an 
understanding of South African signalling principles, practices and 
systems. This conceptual framework formed the basis for the proper 
modelling of train movement authorization. As the researcher is himself a 
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practicing railway signalling engineer, the participant observation method 
was deemed most appropriate in the development of this framework. 
Participant observation, as described by Gill & Johnson (2002) as well as 
Delbridge & Kirkpatrick (1994), is where the researcher attempts to fully 
participate in the lives of his subjects, becoming part of the group or 
organization and being immersed in the research setting. Within the 
spectrum where the researcher’s role can vary from full spectator to full 
participant and the awareness of the subjects being studied (overt or 
covert study), Gill & Johnson (2002) has defined the following taxonomy 
(Figure 3.1): 
 
Participant
observation
Spectator
(4)
Participant-as-observer
(1)
Complete participant
(3)
Observer-as-participant
(2)
Complete observer
Covert
research
Overt
research
 
Figure 3.1  Participant observation role taxonomy 
Source: Gill & Johnson (2002, p. 149) 
 
Within the participant observer spectrum, the participant-as-observer role 
(quadrant 4, Figure 3.1) was deemed most appropriate and presents 
several advantages for the study. Firstly, the trust relationship between the 
researcher and the subjects that is created or exists due to the him being 
part of the group permits him access to activities (discussions and 
technical literature for example) that may otherwise have been out of 
bounds (Punch, 1993). Secondly, the fact that the researcher and the 
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scope of his research is known to the subjects, allows him to ask clarifying 
questions to enhance his understanding. Lastly, this approach may induce 
informants to adopt a perspective of analytic reflection on the processes in 
which they are involved (Robson, 2002). 
 
3.3.2 Model development 
Buede (2009) defines a model as an incomplete representation of reality 
(an abstraction) that is typically used to answer one or more specific 
questions where the answers should provide greater validity or insight 
than is possible without the model. Many examples of models can be 
given. For example, a small scale physical model (quantitative) can be 
used to evaluate the aerodynamics of an aircraft in a wind tunnel. A 
random number generator (quantitative, mathematical) can be used to 
evaluate the statistical propensities when flipping a coin. A system 
requirements specification can be considered a qualitative model of the 
system’s performance and capabilities. These examples can all be 
categorised as descriptive models, as they seek to predict answers to 
questions for which the truth may or may not be obtained in the future. 
Descriptive models are measured by their power or richness of addressing 
a wide range of problems, understandability and accuracy with which they 
can be used to define the relevant entity (Buede, 2009). 
 
Quantitative and qualitative models can also be differentiated by the types 
of answers they can provide.  Quantitative models provide answers that 
are numerical. For example, How much? How often? How good? 
Qualitative models provide symbolic, textual or graphic answers typically 
based on logic, theory or verbal descriptions. For example What needs to 
be done? How well? By what or by whom? Graphic models typically use 
simple artistic means to represent a hierarchical structure, the flow of 
62 
 
 
items or data though a system’s functions, or the dynamic interaction of a 
system’s components (Buede, 2009). 
 
This study opted for the development of a qualitative model, descriptive of 
the structure and behaviour of the system by which train movements are 
and should be authorised and effected within TFR. 
 
3.3.3 Model development process 
Robinson (2004), while acknowledging that modelling is more of an art 
form, has presented the following framework for the process of creating a 
conceptual model: 
 
 Develop an understanding of the problem situation 
 Determine the modelling objectives 
 Design the conceptual model: inputs and outputs 
 Design the conceptual model: the model content 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Framework for Conceptual Modelling 
Source: Robinson (2004, p. 78) 
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The problem situation and modelling objectives for this study were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1 (Introduction). The model also does not 
have inputs and outputs apart from starting with the TCO defining a 
movement authority resulting in the execution and completion of the 
subsequent train movement. The design of the automation model content 
was achieved by forming a concept of TFR signalling practices, followed 
by interviews with signalling engineers during which examples of current 
practice and proposed ideal models were generated. 
 
3.3.4 Modelling language 
A modelling technique also requires a modelling language. Every 
language has semantics, a set of symbols or signs, which form the basis 
of representations in that language. In addition to semantics, every 
language has a syntax that defines proper ways of combining the symbols 
to form thoughts and concepts (Buede, 2009). 
 
There are a multitude of modelling languages that can be used to 
represent the kind of models required by this study. Integrated Definition 
for Functional Modelling (IDEF0), Enhanced Functional Flow Block 
Diagrams (EFFBD’s), Unified Modelling Language (UML) and Systems 
Modelling Language (SysML) are examples of popular modelling 
languages used within the systems engineering community. Considering 
the nature of the models defined in this research, the language selected 
should at a minimum be able to represent the structure and behaviour of 
the system (Buede, 2009). 
 
For the representation of system structure, a simple block diagram 
scheme was employed illustrating the different components and role 
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players within the system and how they relate to one another. Figure 3.3 is 
an example from Buede (2009) of the structure of an elevator system. 
 
:Elevator Car[1..*] :Elevator
Coltroller
:Hallway
Passenger
Interface
:Maintenance
And Service
 
Figure 3.3  Example of System Structure 
Source: Buede (2009, p. 100) 
 
For the representation of system behaviour, the EFFBD language was 
selected. Conventional FFBD’s are made of functional blocks, each 
representing a definite, finite, discrete action to be accomplished. The 
behaviour model is developed using a series of diagrams to show the 
functional decomposition and to display the functions in their logical, 
sequential relationship. Diagrams are laid out so that flow direction is 
generally from left to right. Lines and arrows connecting functions indicate 
function flow and not lapsed time or intermediate activity. Common logical 
operations (i.e. concurrency, selection, iteration, repetition and loops) can 
also be implemented (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2007). 
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Figure 3.4  FFBD example of System Behaviour 
Source: NASA (2007, p. 287) 
 
EFFDB’s expand on the FFBD language by adding a data flow overlay 
indicating data dependencies. An EFFBD specification of a system is 
complete enough so that it is executable as a discrete event model, 
capable of dynamic as well as static, validation. EFFBD’s also provide the 
freedom to use either control constructs or data triggers to specify the 
execution conditions for system functions. Triggering inputs are typically 
indicated with double arrow heads (NASA, 2007). 
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Figure 3.5  EFFBD of System Behaviour 
Source: NASA (2007, p. 288) 
 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
The data collected in this study is qualitative in nature and takes the form 
of conceptual descriptions and descriptive models. This section describes 
the methods of data collection to be employed, covering the development 
and review of the pre-modelling concept of TFR signalling practices as 
well as the sample size and selection of the model development 
interviews. The section concludes with a description of interview planning, 
preparation and execution as well as a sample of interview questions to be 
included in the interviews. 
 
3.4.1 Pre-modelling concept development and review 
The pre-modelling conceptual framework of South African signalling 
practices is based on the researcher’s own knowledge and experiences as 
a signalling engineer. Reference was made to written records and 
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technical literature where possible. To make sure the framework was 
accurate, the resulting write-up was submitted to an experienced signalling 
engineer for review and comment. 
 
3.4.2 Model development interview sample size and selection 
Leedy & Ormrod (2015) defines the research sample as the source items 
from which researchers draw their data from. These sources may include 
people, objects, text materials and electronic records. The way in which 
this sample is identified, depends on the research question(s) asked. If 
inferences are to be drawn about the whole population, the ideal sample 
should be random and unbiased and presumed to be representative of the 
whole population. 
 
Yet there are circumstances when a non-random sample is selected 
purposively and intentionally (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). In such cases, the 
researcher may specifically select data sources that are most likely to help 
in the development of a theory (i.e. theoretical sampling). That same 
researcher may return to particular sources to help substantiate the theory 
(i.e. discriminant sampling). When selecting a sample, Leedy & Ormrod 
(2015) recommends the following: 
 
 Samples should not only include the seemingly typical subject, but 
also non-typical examples. 
 
 Intentionally look for cases that can potentially discredit emerging 
theories. 
 
 If appropriate, select a sample from diverse contexts or situations. 
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In keeping with this, the research sample selected for this study consists 
of the following: 
 
 A sample of three railway signalling engineers was selected. For 
confidentiality purposes these engineers were designated ENG1, 
ENG2 and ENG3. 
 
 All three engineers were selected for their expertise as railway 
signalling engineers with extensive experience (30+ years) when it 
comes to TFR railway operations, signalling practices, projects and 
technologies. 
 
 All three engineers were familiar to the researcher (also a railway 
signalling engineer). The railway signalling community within South 
Africa is quite small and most members are known to each other. 
 
 Of the three engineers, only ENG3 is still directly employed by TFR. 
 
 ENG1 was perceived by the researcher to be of a more 
conservative disposition, comfortable with the status quo and 
generally cautious when it comes to new methods and 
technologies. 
 
 ENG2 was perceived by the researcher to be of a more open-
minded and bold disposition and willing to explore new methods 
and technologies. 
 
 ENG3 is not that well known to the researcher. 
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3.4.3 Model development interview planning, preparation and 
execution 
In preparation for the model development interviews, letters were sent to 
candidates, requesting their participation, describing the nature of the 
interviews, interviewee responsibilities and ethical considerations. The 
contents of these letters were submitted for review to the university ethics 
committee during the research proposal phase of the project and were 
formally accepted. Interviews were also arranged to take place at a time 
and place deemed convenient by interviewees. 
 
Before an interview was initiated, the interviewees were required to sign 
consent forms indicating they understood the nature of the interview, their 
rights and responsibilities as well as the associated ethical issues. The 
contents of this consent form was then submitted for review to the 
university ethics committee during the research proposal phase of the 
project and was formally accepted. 
 
Interviews were in-depth and semi-structured and consisted of the 
development and review of the proposed ideal model by expert signalling 
engineers. Three separate interviews were arranged – one with each 
engineer. One or two simple modelling examples were discussed to 
familiarize the engineer with the modelling language. The background, 
motivations and recommendations upon which the model was to be based 
was explained and discussed with the engineers. Thereafter the engineers 
were required to develop and analyse the proposed model to confirm that 
the model could meet all the needs set out by the critical research 
question. When required, the engineer, aided by the interviewer, could 
modify the model to his satisfaction before signing-off. Any qualifying 
statements or comments were also recorded in the process. 
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Interviews were not recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interview notes, 
however, took the form of drawings, diagrams, descriptions and qualifying 
statements.  
 
3.4.4 Sample of model development interview questions 
The following sample interview questions were defined to bring a measure 
of consistency in the semi-structured interviews: 
 
 Do you agree with the conclusions reached and recommendations 
made by the literature review? 
 
 Is the proposed model based on current practices within TFR 
(current practice model)? 
 
 Was the train driver function automation method recommended by 
the literature review implemented in the proposed ideal model? 
 
 Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? 
 
 Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR 
railway operations? 
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis took the form of the harmonization or consolidation of the 
interview models into a generic or representative model. This was possible 
due to the large degree of commonality between the models. When the 
models did diverge, the diverging features were highlighted and discussed 
as possible options or customizations that could be applied on top of the 
generic model. 
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3.6 STUDY VALIDTY AND RELIABILITY 
Dudovskiy (2011) defines research validity as how well an instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure. If, for example, a scale reports 
the mass of a 4kg object as 3kg, the measurement is considered invalid 
and so is the instrument. Research validity can be divided into the 
categories of internal and external validity. Internal validity specifically 
speaks to the extent to which the research findings match reality while 
external validity speaks to the extent to which the research findings can be 
replicated in other environments. 
 
Dudovskiy (2011), in turn, defines research reliability as the degree to 
which the method produces stable and consistent results. If, for example, 
a scale reports the mass of a 4kg object as 4kg at every measurement, 
the instrument is considered valid as well as reliable. If an incorrect value 
of 5kg was reported at every measurement, the instrument would still be 
considered reliable but not valid. 
 
According to Leedy & Ormrod (2015), qualitative researchers may have 
difficulty applying these definitions as qualitative studies do not ‘measure’ 
things in the numerical way that quantitative studies do. Nevertheless, 
every study (qualitative of quantitative) should be concerned with the 
aspects of validity and reliability. Leedy & Ormrod (2015) has defined 
alternative concepts to describe validity and reliability when it comes to 
qualitative research. Rather than looking at the conventional validity of 
data, rather evaluate if the data is reasonably accurate with regards to the 
characteristics and dynamics of the entities or situation being studied. 
Similarly, instead of looking at the conventional reliability of qualitative 
data, rather evaluate the consistency in the patterns and dynamics these 
characteristics and dynamics reflect. 
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The case for the internal validity (or reasonable accuracy) of the research 
interview data used in this study consists of the following: 
 
 As railway signalling engineers, interviewees are in a good position 
to evaluate the application and efficacy of train driver automation 
methods and the way they relate to train movement authorization 
and violation. As previously outlined, Railway signalling is the 
technical discipline that deals specifically with the challenge of train 
movements, movement authorization and railway safety. 
 
 As senior railway signalling engineers with extensive experience in 
TFR operations and signalling systems, interviewees are in a good 
position to judge the proposed model for suitability in the TFR and 
greater South African railway context. 
 
 The application of a graphical modelling language like EFFBD’s 
instead of text based descriptions should reduce ambiguity of 
meaning and aid the interviewee in visualising and logically 
analysing the proposed model in an objective manner.  
 
 Multiple (three) signalling engineers of differing dispositions and 
from different companies were interviewed. If the findings from the 
interviews are reasonably consistent, the instrument can be 
considered externally valid within the greater South African railway 
context. 
 
 The technical review of the pre-modelling concept by one 
experienced signalling engineer was considered sufficient to verify 
it as reasonably accurate. 
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These measures should assure reasonable accuracy in the captured data. 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) asserts that there may be four prominent threats to 
reliability when conducting interviews. Firstly, the subject or participant 
could make an error. The participant may give an incorrect answer due to 
tiredness or that his mind may be on some other task. Secondly, the 
subject or participant could have a bias. Loyalty to the company or fear of 
discovery might cause the participant to choose to deliver a good report 
instead of a true report. Thirdly, the observer or researcher may make an 
error. When conducting semi-structured interviews, the observer may be 
lead to investigate certain important angles in one interview that is not 
pursued in the others leading to inconsistencies. Lastly, the observer or 
researcher may have a bias. The observer may interpret a response to 
conform to his preferences instead of what was ‘meant’ by the respondent. 
 
The case for the reliability (or reasonable consistency) of the research 
interview data used in this study consists of the following: 
 
 A formalised and industry recognised model development process 
was followed (Robinson, 2004). 
 
 Model development is an accepted research method and has been 
successfully applied in other studies (Shafique & Mahmood, 2010). 
 
 Arranging interviews to be at times and locations that are 
convenient to interviewees, should minimise the effects of subject 
or participant error. 
 
 Protecting the identities of interviewees and selecting them from 
multiple companies should minimise the effects of subject or 
participant bias. 
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 The preparation of a set of major interview questions that should be 
asked at every interview should minimise the effects of the 
participant observer (researcher) error. 
 
 The application of a graphical modelling language like EFFBD’s 
instead of text based descriptions should reduce ambiguity of 
meaning and aid the interviewee in visualising and logically 
analysing the proposed model in an objective manner. This 
measure should help to minimise the effects of observer bias. 
 
 Multiple (three) signalling engineers of differing dispositions and 
from different companies were interviewed. If the findings from the 
interviews are reasonably consistent, the instrument can be 
considered reliable. 
 
These measures should assure reasonable consistency in the captured 
data. 
 
3.7 ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS 
The following ethics considerations were identified as relevant to the 
study: 
 
 Before any interviews could be conducted with signalling engineers 
about their TFR experience, TFR had to give permission.  An 
application was submitted to TFR and permission was granted to 
proceed with the interviews. 
 
 Due to the sensitive nature of research into SPADs and the causes 
of SPADs, the names of the interviewees were kept confidential. 
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Reference to interviewees was made by using code names only 
(i.e. ENG1). Any data captured during the interviews (audio, video, 
drawings and text) was also considered confidential. This 
information was stored on a secure data store with password 
protection. This data is to be stored for a period of 5 years after 
which it will be deleted or destroyed. 
 
The ethics clearance reference number issued for this study is MIAEC 
005/17. 
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3.8 RESEARCH PROJECT LIFECYCLE 
Figure 3.6 is a summary representation of the resulting project lifecycle. 
The project was divided into distinct project proposal and implementation 
phases. 
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Figure 3.6  Research Project Lifecycle 
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4 RESULTS 
This chapter will present the results collected in this study. This includes 
the conceptualization of signalling practices within TFR based on available 
technical documentation and reviews with experienced signalling 
engineers in addition to the data collected during modelling interviews with 
the experienced signalling engineers. The raw interview data is available 
in the appendix section. 
 
4.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SIGNALLING PRACTICES WITHIN 
TFR 
The purpose of this section is to develop an understanding of how railway 
movements are effected within TFR, the roles and functions signalling 
system actors (the train driver and Train Control Officer (TCO) for 
example) and signalling system components (interlocking and field 
elements for example) play in those movements. This section presents an 
overview of railway signalling practices in TFR while highlighting the 
implications for SPAD incidents and causes. 
 
Unfortunately, South Africa’s specific railway signalling principles, methods 
and technologies are not well documented in engineering manuals or 
guideline documents. This knowledge mostly resides within the minds of 
signalling engineers and has traditionally been transferred from one 
generation to the next by means of on-the-job training and mentoring 
processes. Although there may be a large degree of apparent international 
commonality in technologies and applications, the specific meanings of 
signals and signal aspects may differ, technologies may be applied in 
different ways and operational conventions and rules pertaining to train 
movements have been tailored to suit the local realities. This characteristic 
is best illustrated by the fact that all signalling systems and technologies 
procured for application in South Africa, have to go through a process 
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commonly referred to as localization and type approval. During this 
process the supplier of the system or technology has to demonstrate 
compliance with local rules and practices including legacy system 
interfaces and may need to modify or customize his system for that 
purpose.  The localization and type approval before the implementation of 
signalling systems and technologies is considered to be standard practice 
in many countries around the world. 
 
4.1.1 Functional Structure:  Typical TFR Signalling and Operational 
Control System 
A typical TFR Signalling and Control System can best be visualized in 
layers stacked on top of each other connecting the Train Control Officer 
(TCO), who represents railway operational objectives such as the train 
movement schedule, at the very top to the trains, and signalling field 
elements at the very bottom. Figure 4.1 has been adapted from 
Trinckauf’s (2009) Functional structure of the railway control system to be 
more representative of TFR signalling and control. Refer to Figure 4.2 for 
an explanation of the symbols used. 
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Control 
Units
Interlocking
Remote Control (Man-Machine Interface)
Control 
Units
Control 
Units
Interlocking
Control 
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Vital
Data
Train Control Officer
(Operations Control Level)
(Interlocking Level)
(Field Element Level)
(Element Control Level)
Station A Station B
 
Figure 4.1  Typical TFR Signalling & Operational Control System  
Source: Adapted from Trinckauf (2009, p. 21)  
 
Base Head
Direction of 
Approach
Points lay for the Left 
(Turnout)
Points lay for the 
Right (Straight)
Driver
Train
Orientation or direction of 
movement
Simplified Symbol for Signal Simplified Symbol for Points Set Simplified Symbol for Train  
Figure 4.2  Symbol Explanations of Field Elements 
 
4.1.2 Signalling for Railway Operation 
At this point, it is appropriate to consider exactly how signals are used to 
facilitate safe railway movements on TFR lines. This section represents an 
application of the TFR train working rules (Spoornet, 2002) as well as the 
relevant functional requirements for signal interlocking systems 
implemented on TFR lines (Jooste, 2013). 
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Principles of Train Separation 
The most common train separation methods include Signalled Fixed Block 
Operation and Cab Signal Operation of which the Fixed Block is the 
dominant method on TFR signalled lines (described in section 2.1.2).  
 
On un-signalled TFR lines, constituting roughly 60% of all TFR lines, 
operational control is governed by a Track Warrant System (TWS). 
Movement authorities are managed within the in-house developed CS90 
remote control and Visual Display Unit (VDU) system.  
 
Signals and Signal Aspects 
On TFR signalled lines the dominant practice is that of colour-light 
signalling with fixed block operation. This section will attempt to explain 
how signals are used to guide a train though a railway network, 
communicating compulsory movement authorities to the train driver who is 
then expected to follow them to the letter. As railway signalling rules, 
philosophies and applications are not universal and as practices within 
TFR specifically are the subject of this study, the latest TFR specific 
signalling rules and definitions (commonly referred to as multiple-aspect 
signalling) shall be applied in the explanations to follow. 
 
Based on the role that signals play in Signalled Fixed Block Working and 
the basic requirement of providing a timely warning to train drivers, the 
functions of a signal can be listed to be the following: 
 
a. Communication of movement authority into a block section 
including the nature of that authority (eg. permission to proceed and 
speed restrictions). 
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b. Inform the train driver as to the upcoming features of the track 
ahead (eg. upcoming turnouts, entry into yards and sidings). 
 
As many different possible meanings have to be conveyed to the driver, 
the signal has been equipped with several different lamps of various 
colours and arranged in several different configurations. These lamps can 
then be activated in predetermined combinations to indicate specific 
meanings called signal aspects. 
 
Figure 4.3 is a representation of a typical TFR signal that a driver would 
encounter when approaching a station (Jooste, 2013). On the left is the 
physical representation of the signal pole populated with a green lamp, red 
lamp, white lamp, two yellow lamps, a signal identification plate and a 
shunt lamp-set (two small white lamps arranged diagonally). 
 
Single Aspects Only i.e Red, Yellow, Green
Flashing Aspects Only i.e Yellow, Red
Shunt Signal
Signal Base
White Light
Goods & Siding Signal
STA 160
 
Figure 4.3  Colour light signal (physical representation and 
symbology) 
Source: Adapted from Jooste (2013, pp. 117-121) 
Source: Adapted from Transnet (1996, p. 36) 
 
On the right side is a symbol of the same signal as it would be indicated 
on the engineering drawing of a signalling layout (Transnet, 1996). The 
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symbol represents all of the different aspects that the given signal should 
be able to present. 
 
Inside the circle at the top is indicated all the single aspects that the signal 
can present: 
 
Vertical line: [Solid Green only] Proceed at line speed. 
 
Diagonal line: [Solid Yellow only] Proceed but be prepared to stop at the 
next signal. The uppermost yellow lamp should be used 
for this aspect. 
 
Horizontal line: [Solid Red only] Stop. The thicker line is used to indicate 
this is the default and most restrictive aspect the signal 
can present. 
 
Inside the second circle from the top is indicated all of the flashing aspects 
the signal can present. The flashing nature of these aspects are indicated 
by the two solid black dots arranged diagonally inside the circle. 
 
Diagonal line: [Flashing Yellow] Proceed at the correct speed for the 
train to turn out over one or more points sets (lower 
speed type) after this signal or the next. The uppermost 
yellow lamp should be used for this aspect. 
 
Horizontal line: [Flashing Red] Emergency signal. Stop, then proceed in 
such a manner as to be able to stop within sighting 
distance. 
 
The third item on the symbol is the white light that is used as an additional 
qualification on the other mainline proceed aspects. When combined with 
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a solid green, flashing green or flashing yellow the white simply means 
that you should be prepared to stop at the 2nd signal ahead with the next 
signal located at less than the stopping distance from that stop signal. 
 
The fourth item on the signal symbol is the shunt signal lamp-set. Shunt 
movements are special train movements used in train reconfiguration and 
staging and are usually confined to stations and stations yards.  As these 
movements typically include trains being authorised onto occupied tracks, 
these movements are slow and are executed with the assistance of 
additional shunt personnel. This lamp-set is always combined with a solid 
red lamp to indicate that it is not a proceed authority but that the route is 
setup for a shunt movement and the driver should prepare to receive 
instructions from shunt personnel. 
 
The last item on the symbol is a diagonal line inside a smaller circle. This 
is presented by a solid yellow on the second yellow lamp located on the 
signal. This lamp combined with the solid red is used to indicate to the 
driver he is about to enter a goods siding, typically un-signalled, and he 
should proceed on a by-sight basis with the understanding that the road is 
clear until the next control point. 
 
It should then also be noted that in the case where none of the lamps are 
burning (“dark” signal) as may be the case in technical failure, the signal 
should be interpreted as a conventional stop signal, similar to the single 
solid red. If we add up all these different meanings or signal aspects, a 
signal with this physical configuration can be used to display up to thirteen 
different aspects. 
 
So, how is this system used to communicate with the train driver? Figure 
4.4 is a representation of a train approaching a station points set. 
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[Solid Red]
[Solid Yellow]
[Solid Green]
[Flashing Yellow]
Stop / Danger
Proceed - prepare to stop at next signal
Proceed at line speed
Proceed – prepare to turn out in this or next block section
 
Figure 4.4  Single aspects on the approach to a station 
 
The signal at the points is indicating Stop or “signal at danger”. The signal 
directly in front of the driver is indicating he can safely proceed at line 
speed and from it he can deduce that the next signal he will encounter will 
also be at proceed, illustrating the fact that the driver can “see” roughly 
two signals ahead. As the driver proceeds to the next signal, he is notified 
that he can proceed with caution as he will be expected to stop at the 
following signal. 
 
Figure 4.5 is another example of the application of flashing aspects. In 
both cases the flashing yellow is indicating that the driver may proceed 
and be prepared to turn out over a set of points in the next two sections. 
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Train Route Rail Track
 
Figure 4.5  Flashing aspects on approach to a turn-out 
 
The consequences of misreading or even completely missing a signal can 
vary from the benign to the severe. If a flashing yellow is misread as a 
solid yellow, the train may apply brakes and slow down too soon, simply 
resulting in an operational inefficiency. If the reverse happened (i.e. 
reading a solid yellow as a flashing yellow), the train will not slow down 
and prepare to stop at the stop signal ahead, possibly resulting in a train 
collision. If the white light that accompanied the green is missed, the train 
will come upon the signal warning them of the stop ahead with too little 
space to stop within. The worst case would obviously be to miss a stop 
signal or to come upon a stop signal unprepared which may result in a 
train collision while traveling at line speed. 
 
Interlocking Principles 
TFR interlocking systems typically implement the “Protected route and 
Overlap” method. TFR interlocked routes can also be manually cancelled 
by the TCO, but if the train has already entered the route or occupied the 
approach track to the entry signal, the signal is put back to Danger 
(stop/red aspect) but the route remains reserved and locked for a 
predetermined time before normalising. This prevents endangering the 
train and allows the driver to bring the train under control and to a safe 
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stop without fear of a collision or derailment due to points being thrown 
under the train. 
 
Signalling a Layout (Crossing Station) 
The purpose of the crossing station is to increase bi-directional traffic 
density over a single line, albeit at the added cost of additional operational 
complexity. As traffic density demands increase, more and more crossing 
stations can be added, until traffic levels justify dedicated directional lines. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates a typical signalling layout for a crossing station. 
 
Starter Signal
Home Signal
Intermediate Home Signal
Warning Signal
Loop Line
Main Line
 
Figure 4.6  Signalled Layout (Crossing Station) 
 
The purpose of the indicated signals in this layout are as follows: 
 
Warning Signal: Warns the driver that he is approaching a stop signal. 
Note this signal does not have a Stop aspect. This signal 
is sometimes erroneously referred to as a distant signal. 
 
Int. Home Signal: First stop signal when approaching the station and acts 
to protect the overlap of a route setup from the opposite 
side of the station. 
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Home Signal: Stop signal before station entry. This signal is to regulate 
access to the station. 
 
Starter Signal: This signal has a dual purpose – it can either be used as 
a destination signal for a train entering the station 
(Danger Aspect) or as a departure signal for a train 
exiting the station (Proceed Aspect). 
 
Dispatching Principles 
Train movements over a railway network can be coordinated by means of 
either a de-centralised or centralised traffic control model. 
 
In a Decentralised Operation the train movements are controlled by local 
interlocking stations. The TCOs of neighbouring interlocking stations 
communicate with each other by means of telecommunication, mostly by 
simple telephone connections (Pachl, 2009). This model is illustrated in 
Figure 4.7. 
 
Interlocking Interlocking Interlocking Interlocking
Station Station Station Station
TCO TCO TCO TCO
Telecommunications Network
 
Figure 4.7  Decentralised Operation 
Source: Adapted from Pachl (2009, p. 59) 
 
In Centralised Traffic Control (CTC), all points and signals inside the 
controlled area are directly controlled by the CTC TCO. All train 
movements are governed by signal indications. The local interlockings are 
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remote-controlled without local staff (Pachl, 2009). CTC operation is the 
predominant model on TFR lines. This model is illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
 
Interlocking Interlocking Interlocking Interlocking
Station Station Station Station
Vital
Comms
Vital
Comms
Vital
Comms
CTC TCO
Remotre Control Network
 
Figure 4.8  Centralised Traffic Control (CTC) 
Source: Adapted from Pachl (2009, p. 60) 
 
4.2 ENG1 INTERVIEW DATA 
ENG1 listed two distinct modes of train authorization within TFR that may 
be relevant to this study. Refer to appendix 9.1 for the detailed summary 
of the interview. They comprise those of fully fledged signalled operations 
and those of Track Warrant operations. Yet, in his estimation, the fact that 
Track Warrant operations are considered such a low safety risk as to not 
justify being upgraded to fully signalled operations does not recommend 
them for driver automation upgrades to mitigate SPADs. The only mode 
authorization to be modelled, was that of fully fledged signalled operations. 
 
ENG1 generally agreed with the assessment and recommendations from 
the literature review. In his estimation the model should at least be based 
on an Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system that intervenes by 
applying the brakes if the train driver is found to exceed the speed limit or 
required braking curve to successfully stop in front of a stop signal. Lastly, 
the system should be applicable to train movements both within and 
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between stations, the driver should not be able to override the safety 
system and it should be able to be installed on most locomotives. 
 
ENG1 also identified the enforcement of optimal speed and driving profiles 
a significant advantage to counter what he called “malicious driver 
behaviour” which he considered to be a major problem on South African 
railways. Such behaviour would typically include a driver driving the train 
at a significantly lower than optimal speed so as to extend his shift and 
become eligible for overtime. The system should therefore guide the driver 
towards optimal speed profiles typically by means of an in-cab display 
presenting a speed target window for the train to stay within. 
 
4.2.1.1 Fully Signalled Operation (FSO) 
Figure 4.9 is a representation of the typical train movement to be used as 
the basis for the modelling exercise. 
 
Start-out Route Follow-on Route
Departure
Signal
Destination
Signal
Proceed
Signal
 
Figure 4.9  Train Movement in Fully Signalled Operation 
 
Figure 4.10 is a representation of the resulting systems structure for the 
Current Practice (CP) model. 
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TCO
Train Driver
Train Track
Signalling
System
 
Figure 4.10 System Structure – FSO, CP Model, ENG1 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Signalling System: Computer based control terminal 
 Signalling System – Track: Train detection device (axle counter / 
track circuit) 
 Signalling System – Train Driver: Signal lamp 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
 
For practical and presentation purposes, the behaviour model was 
segmented into three distinct phases: 
 
 Phase1 – Movement Setup (Figure 4.11) 
 Phase2 – Route Traversal (Figure 4.12) 
 Phase3 – End of Authority (Figure 4.13) 
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Define Route
TCO
Signalling System
Receive Route definition
Route 
Available?
Reserve and Lock
Route Elemets
Report Route Setup Failure
No
Yes
Receive
Failure Report
Route
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Report Successful
Route Setup
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Route Success Report
Ph2
AND
Failure
Report
Success 
Report
AND
AND
** Alternative
Authorization Method
** Note: Failure to setup route should lead to the TCO having to try again. If the failure presists, the TCO may
                 have to fall back to a manual or abnormal authorization method (Outside the scope of this model).
 
Figure 4.11  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – FSO, CP Model, ENG1 
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Figure 4.12 System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – FSO, CP Model, ENG1 
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Figure 4.13  System Behaviour Phase3 (End of Authority) – FSO, CP Model, ENG1 
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The modifications introduced during the development of the Proposed 
Automation (PA) model is indicated in BLUE. This model also specifically 
shows what would happen if a driver fails to keep within the required 
speed limits. The structure and behaviour of Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
and Phase3 (End of Authority) remained unchanged from the CP model. 
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Figure 4.14  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – FSO, PA Model, ENG1 
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When presented with the following interview questions regarding the 
proposed automation model, ENG1 answered all of them in the 
affirmative: 
 
a. Was the train driver function automation method recommended by 
the literature review implemented in the proposed ideal model? 
 
b. Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? 
 
c. Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR 
railway operations? 
 
4.3 ENG2 INTERVIEW DATA 
ENG2 also listed the two distinct modes of train authorization within TFR 
relevant to this study to be those of fully fledged signalled operations and 
those of Track Warrant operations but required both to be considered for 
driver automation upgrades. Refer to appendix 9.2 for the detailed 
summary of the interview. 
 
ENG2 generally agreed with the assessment and recommendations from 
the literature review. In his estimation the model should be based on an 
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system that intervenes by applying the 
brakes if the train driver is found to exceed the speed limit or required 
braking curve to successfully stop in front of a stop signal. Lastly, the 
system should not impact the train working rules, prioritize safety above 
productivity and in the implementation thereof there should be 
consequences for the driver if found to drive poorly. 
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4.3.1.1 Fully Signalled Operation 
The typical train movement used in the modelling exercise was the same 
as that for ENG1 (refer to Figure 4.9). 
 
Figure 4.15 is a representation of the resulting systems structure for the 
Current Practice (CP) model. 
 
TCO
Remote Control
Interlocking
Signal
Train Driver
Train Track
Points
 
Figure 4.15  System Structure – FSO, CP Model, ENG2 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Remote Control: Computer based control terminal 
 Remote Control – Interlocking: Communications network 
 Interlocking – Points: Points blade detection device 
 Interlocking – Signal: Lamp drive circuit 
 Interlocking – Track: Train detection device (axle counter / track 
circuit) 
 Signal – Train Driver: Signal lamp (Optical) 
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 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
 
For practical and presentation purposes, the behaviour model was 
segmented into three distinct phases: 
 
 Phase1 – Movement Setup (Figure 4.16) 
 Phase2 – Route Traversal (Figure 4.17) 
 Phase3 – End of Authority (Figure 4.18) 
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Figure 4.16  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – FSO, CP Model, ENG2 
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Figure 4.17  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – FSO, CP Model, ENG2 
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Figure 4.18  System Behaviour Phase3 (End of Authority) – FSO, CP Model, ENG2
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The modifications introduced during the development of the Proposed 
Automation (PA) model are indicated in BLUE. This model also 
intentionally shows specifically what would happen if a driver fails to keep 
to the required speed limits. The behaviour of Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
and Phase3 (End of Authority) remained unchanged from that of the CP 
model. 
 
Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20 are updated versions of the system structure 
and system behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) that represents the PA 
model. 
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Figure 4.19  System Structure – FSO, PA Model, ENG2 
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Interface listing: 
 TCO – Remote Control: Computer based control terminal 
 Remote Control – Interlocking: Communications network 
 Interlocking – Points: Points blade detection device 
 Interlocking – Signal: Lamp drive circuit 
 Interlocking – Track: Train detection device (axle counter / track 
circuit) 
 Interlocking – Train Borne Interlocking Components: Safety critical 
communications network 
 Signal – Train Driver: Signal lamp (Optical) 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train Driver – Train Borne Interlocking Components: Visual display 
terminal 
 Train – Train Borne Interlocking Components: Instrumentation suite 
(including speedometer and odometer) 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
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Figure 4.20  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – FSO, PA Model, ENG2 
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4.3.1.2 Track Warrant Operation (TWO) 
Figure 4.21 is a representation of the typical train movement to be used as 
the basis for the modelling exercise. 
 
Start-out Route Follow-on Route
Authority 
Received
Speed 
Board
Limit of 
Authority
 
Figure 4.21  Train Movement in Track Warrant Operation 
 
Figure 4.22 is a representation of the resulting systems structure for the 
Current Practice (CP) model. The “signalling element” component was 
added for completeness after the interview was completed as it was 
present in the behaviour diagram but missing in the structure diagram.  
 
TCO
Operational Control 
System (CS90)
Train Driver
Train TrackPoints
Signalling Element
(Speed Board)
 
Figure 4.22  System Structure – TWO, CP Model, ENG2 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Operational Control System: Computer based control 
terminal 
 TCO – Train Driver: Radio / Cellular phone 
 Train Driver – Signalling Element: Notice board (Optical) 
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 Train Driver – Points: Visually observed (Optical) 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
 
For practical and presentation purposes, the behaviour model was 
segmented into three distinct phases: 
 
 Phase1 – Movement Setup (Figure 4.23) 
 Phase2 – Route Traversal (Figure 4.24) 
 Phase3 – End of Authority (Figure 4.25) 
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Figure 4.23  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – TWO, CP Model, ENG2 
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Figure 4.24  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – TWO, CP Model, ENG2 
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Figure 4.25  System Behaviour Phase3 (End of Authority) – TWO, CP Model, ENG2 
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The modifications introduced during the development of the Proposed 
Automation (PA) model is indicated in BLUE. This model also specifically 
shows what would happen if a driver fails to keep to the required speed 
limits. The behaviour of Phase3 (End of Authority) remained unchanged 
from that of the CP model. 
 
Figure 4.26, Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28 are updated versions of the 
system structure and system behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) and 
Phase2 (Route Traversal) that represents the PA model. The “signalling 
element” component was added for completeness after the interview was 
completed as it was present in the behaviour diagram but missing in the 
structure diagram. 
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Figure 4.26  System Structure –TWO, PA Model, ENG2 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Operational Control System: Computer based control 
terminal 
 TCO – Train Driver: Radio / Cellular phone 
 Operational Control System – Train Borne Interlocking: High-
integrity communications network 
 Train Driver – Signalling Element: Notice board (Optical) 
 Train Driver – Points: Visually observed (Optical) 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
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 Train Driver – Train Borne Interlocking: Visual display terminal 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
 Train – Train Borne Interlocking: Instrumentation suite (including 
speedometer and odometer) 
 Train Borne Interlocking – GPS: Satellite communication  
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Figure 4.27  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – TWO, PA Model, ENG2 
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Figure 4.28  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – TWO, PA Model, ENG2 
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When presented with the following interview questions regarding the 
proposed automation models, ENG2 answered all of them in the 
affirmative: 
 
a. Was the train driver function automation method recommended by 
the literature review implemented in the proposed ideal model? 
 
b. Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? 
 
c. Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR 
railway operations? 
 
4.4 ENG3 INTERVIEW DATA 
Due to the large degree of commonality between the Current Practice 
models and the Proposed Automation models produced by ENG1 and 
ENG2, the interview format for ENG3 was rather directed towards the 
confirmation or rejection of those models Refer to appendix 9.3 for the 
detailed summary of the interview. ENG3 was therefore presented with 
consolidated versions of the recommendations and models from ENG1 
and ENG2 and asked for his evaluation. 
 
ENG3 generally agreed with the assessment and recommendations from 
the literature review as well as the recommendations and the consolidated 
models produced from those generated by ENG1 and ENG2 (Current 
Practice as well as Proposed Automation models). When also presented 
with the same three interview questions regarding the consolidated 
proposed automation model, ENG3 answered all of them in the 
affirmative. 
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The consolidated and now accepted versions of the Current Practice and 
Proposed Automation models will be presented and discussed in the next 
chapter (chapter 5). 
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5 ANALYSIS 
This chapter will present an analysis of the model data collected in this 
study and propose a consolidated or generic train driver function 
automation model than can be considered most appropriate for the TFR 
environment. This analysis includes the description and discussion of the 
commonalities and differences for both the Current Practice and Proposed 
Automation models as well as motivation for the final selection of the most 
appropriate model. 
 
It should be noted that the actual models generated in the interview 
process did not always strictly adhere to the proper notation conventions 
associated with the EFFBD modelling language. Examples of such 
deviations include: 
 
 A concurrency structure that start with a single “AND” operation and 
terminate in two separate “AND” operations due to logical branches 
introduced in between (See Figure 4.16). The “Kill” command was 
also used to indicate the termination of other branches when 
particular branch completed its run first. 
 
 A concurrency structure (AND) that is initiated but is not terminated 
(see Figure 4.11) or an OR operation erroneously used to terminate 
an AND structure (see Figure 4.27). 
 
 Sometimes functions or data items were not given unique names. A 
typical example can be seen in Figure 4.12 where a generic 
function “Receive Report” is called in multiple instances even 
though different kinds of reports are received in those instances. 
 
117 
 
 
 Data item flows or exchanges between functions within the same 
branch were not shown as they would introduce a lot of clutter and 
complication to behaviour diagrams. On the other hand, the 
indication of data item flows between branches (effectively, data 
flows between system components) were considered essential. 
 
 Behaviour branches with no activity were not included on behaviour 
diagrams. These branches were only shown when they became 
active. In Figure 4.11 the behaviour branches for the train driver 
and the train are not shown. As soon as those components become 
active, their branches are also shown (Figure 4.12). This was done 
limit clutter. 
 
As these models were intended to be primarily descriptive, these 
deviations were not considered problematic as long as the models were 
readable, understandable, logical and unambiguous. Per implication, 
these models may require a measure of reformulation if they are to be 
ported into software tools for simulation purposes. 
 
5.1 CURRENT PRACTICE MODEL 
There is a large degree of commonality between the Current Practice 
models generated by ENG1 an ENG2. This is not unexpected for the 
following reasons: 
 
 Both engineers are describing the actual practices in an industry in 
which both have practiced for decades. 
 
 Both models were drawn by the researcher while being guided and 
criticized by the interviewees. It can be expected the models would 
therefore reflect the way that the researcher visualized the structure 
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and behaviour of the modelled system, whilst also being considered 
accurate by the responsible interviewee. 
 
The major differences between the models generated by ENG1 and ENG2 
are: 
 
 ENG1 did not generate a model for Track Warrant operations. 
 
 ENG1 described behaviour of the signalling system as a whole 
where ENG2 preferred to include the structure and behaviour of 
signalling system components including the interlocking, remote 
control and train-borne system components. 
 
These differences do not represent a contradiction or even a serious 
deviation for the following reason. If the level of detail in the ENG2 Current 
Practice model is reduced to the signalling system level, the differences 
between the model by ENG1 and the models by ENG2 (both FSO and 
TWO models) become that of technological implementation only and not 
of methodology. This view, together with the resulting model presented 
below (generic CP model), was confirmed in the ENG3 interview: 
 
 Structure (Figure 5.1) 
 Phase1 – Movement Setup (Figure 5.2) 
 Phase2 – Route Traversal (Figure 5.3 
 Phase3 – End of Authority (Figure 5.4) 
 
119 
 
 
TCO
Train Driver
Train Track
Signalling
System
 
Figure 5.1  System Structure – Generic CP Model 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Signalling System: Computer based control terminal 
 Signalling System – Track: Train detection device (axle counter / 
track circuit) 
 Signalling System – Train Driver: Signal lamp 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
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Figure 5.2  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – Generic CP Model 
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Figure 5.3  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – Generic CP Model 
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Figure 5.4  System Behaviour Phase3 (End of Authority) – Generic CP Model 
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5.2 PROPOSED AUTOMATION MODEL 
There is also a large degree of commonality between the Proposed 
Automation models generated by ENG1 and ENG2. Both engineers based 
their models on Automatic Train Protection systems that intervene when 
the driver exceeds the required speed profiles. Both engineers also 
required their systems to police driving behaviour in order to promote 
efficient driving. 
 
As with the Current Practice models, it should again be noted that if the 
level of detail of the models generated by ENG2 is reduced to the 
signalling system level and not the system component level, the 
differences between the Proposed Automation models for the Fully 
Signalled and Track Warrant operations are also reduced to simple 
differences in technology and not methodology. The resulting generic 
model, if presented on the signalling system level of detail, will therefore 
apply to both Fully Signalled and Track Warrant operations. This view 
together with the resulting model presented below (generic PA model) was 
confirmed in the ENG3 interview (modifications indicated in blue): 
 
 Structure (Figure 5.5) 
 Phase1 – Movement Setup (Figure 5.6) 
 Phase2 – Route Traversal (Figure 5.7) 
 Phase3 – End of Authority (Figure 5.8) 
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Figure 5.5  System Structure – Generic PA Model 
 
Interface listing: 
 TCO – Signalling System: Computer based control terminal 
 Signalling System – Track: Train detection device (axle counter / 
track circuit) 
 Signalling System – Train Driver: Signal lamp 
 Train Driver – Train: Driver instrument panel 
 Train – Track: Wheel on track 
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Figure 5.6  System Behaviour Phase1 (Movement Setup) – Generic PA Model 
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Figure 5.7  System Behaviour Phase2 (Route Traversal) – Generic PA Model 
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Figure 5.8  System Behaviour Phase3 (End of Authority) – Generic PA Model 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter will briefly discuss how the project met its defined objectives 
in an effort to answer the research question. This includes a discussion on 
how the results compared with the literature, how project objectives were 
met, if the problem under investigation was solved and if the research 
question was effectively answered. 
 
Firstly, the resulting automation model confirmed the recommendations 
presented by the literature review as the modifications introduced were 
based on ATP systems consisting of a technical safety system that 
monitors driver behaviour and automatically intervenes in unsafe 
circumstances. Such systems are equivalent the automation level (Level1 
- manual driving with technical supervision) - presented by the literature as 
the most appropriate method. 
 
All of the defined research objectives were successfully met in the 
following ways: 
 
A conceptualization of TFR signalling practices was developed from 
consultations with experienced signalling engineers and a review of the 
available technical literature. The result was also reviewed and endorsed 
by one of the interviewed signalling engineers. 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews with signalling engineers were used to 
generate a model representative of the current practice within TFR in train 
movement authorization. All models were developed using a credible 
methodology, utilizing modelling languages and concepts that are well 
known within the system engineering community. The resulting model was 
endorsed as accurate by all of the signalling engineers interviewed. 
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The interviewees were also required to generate a proposed ideal 
automation model that would be effective in mitigating SPADS and that 
could be considered the most appropriate within the TFR environment. 
The resulting model was endorsed by all of the signalling engineers 
interviewed. 
 
As a final test of the proposed automation model satisfied that critical 
research question, all of the interviewed signalling engineers were asked 
the following verifying questions: 
 
 Do you agree with the recommendations from the literature review 
and if those recommendations were faithfully implemented in the 
proposed automation model? 
 
 Would the resulting automation model be effective in mitigating 
SPADs and would you consider it to be the most appropriate train 
driver automation method for the TFR environment? 
 
All of the interviewed signalling engineers answered in the affirmative. 
 
In conclusion it can be stated that the resulting automation model 
effectively answered the research question in defining the most 
appropriate train driver automation model to mitigate SPADs in the TFR 
environment. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER STUDY 
Operator automation is a field that presents enormous potential 
advantages when it comes to the technological augmentation of human 
capabilities, yet it comes with significant engineering challenges as well. 
As has been evident in this study, this statement also holds true when 
considering the automation of the train driver within the TFR environment. 
At first glance, the completely automatic control of a train seems to be the 
simplest thing in the world yet when you step back and consider train 
control within the greater context of railway operation (the systems 
engineer’s view), there are significant challenges that become apparent. 
 
A thorough review of the literature has shown that human train driver 
errors and violations significantly contribute as causes of SPADs (a 
fundamental failure in driving safety) yet it has also been shown that the 
additional roles and functions fulfilled by a human train driver (i.e. 
intervention and support under abnormal circumstances) are not as easily 
automated. The most practical and readily available train driver 
automation model, mitigating most of the costs imposed by human failure 
associated with SPAD events yet retaining the value of human flexibility, 
was demonstrated to be that of retaining the human driver yet with 
technical supervision. In this arrangement, the human driver would remain 
in his conventional role of driving the train but with a technical supervision 
system superimposed that automatically intervenes if a train driver 
exceeds his movement authority. In addition, such a system could be 
tailored to also guide the driver towards optimal driving profiles. 
 
The recommendations from the literature as well as the resulting generic 
model were wholeheartedly endorsed by the signalling engineers 
interviewed, affirming it met the requirements set out by the research 
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question: That of being the most appropriate method of train driver 
function automation to mitigate SPADs in the TFR railway environment. 
 
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The financial costs typically attached to the safety systems and 
technologies such as Automatic Train Protection (ATP) can be significant 
and often prohibitive for large scale implementation and support in third 
world countries such as South Africa. In many cases (e.g. rural lines that 
carry predominantly freight traffic) the traffic densities and potential risk 
levels may not justify the costs associated with equipment carrying the 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) ratings of SIL3 or SIL4 (BSI, 1999), typically 
associated with the high traffic density on metro lines. In such cases, the 
application of SIL1 or SIL2 systems may be sufficient if combined with soft 
strategies like the informal driver strategies presented by Naweed et al. 
(2015). The formalization and scientific evaluation of the effects on risk 
reduction of such strategies and initiatives, may prove a fruitful field for 
further study. 
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9.1 ENG1 INTERVIEW DATA (RAW) 
This appendix presents the raw data gathered from the interview with ENG1 (real name masked). Interview data includes a 
rundown of interview activities and interview findings covering pre-modelling discussion points, generated models and 
concluding remarks. 
 
9.1.1 Interview execution 
During the interview, the following actions were performed: 
 
i. ENG1 reviewed and signed consent letter. Permission letter from TFR was made available for review if required. 
ii. ENG1 and interviewer reviewed and discussed the literature review findings and theoretical basis for the project 
approach. The review covered the following (see attached info sheet): 
 
a. Research question 
b. The appropriateness of TFR as the subject of this study 
c. Typical causes of SPADs 
d. SPADs within TFR 
e. Selected train driver automation framework 
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f. Fundamental challenges to operator automation including the ironies of automation and the hidden roles of the 
train driver. 
g. Review of the conclusion and motivation for the selection of Automation Level 1 (manual driving with technical 
supervision) as the most appropriate model of train driver automation to mitigate SPADs in the TFR environment. 
 
iii. Introduction to the selected modelling method and language. Models should at least describe system structure and 
system behaviour. 
iv. Initial modelling of system, describing how a rail movement authorization translates into an actual movement with 
emphasis on the role of the train driver. 
v. ENG1 was presented the hypothesis confirmation / rejection questions 
 
9.1.2 Interview findings: Pre-modelling discussion 
The following findings were recorded as part of the pre-modelling discussion: 
 
 ENG1 accepted and agreed with the conclusions presented by the literature review stating that the most appropriate 
model within the given framework should be based on Automatic Train Protection (ATP). At a first glance, ENG1 felt 
that the system should only intervene in cases where the speed limit is exceeded and also only when approaching 
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danger signals (the minimum required to meet the safety goals) but stated that a system that guides the driver towards 
optimal driving patterns would be a great advantage. ENG1 emphasized that, from his observations and experience 
during his career in the SA railway industry, “malicious driver behaviour” is a major problem in South African railway 
operations. He described an example of such behaviour as where drivers would be driving especially slowly in order to 
be able to claim over-time. The desired system should therefore guide the driver towards the optimal speed profiles, 
probably taking the form of a target speed window for the driver to conform to, and if violated, then a real-time warning 
to the driver as well as capturing detail of each incident to record and subsequently remedy noncompliant driver 
behaviour Similar approaches to discouraging other driver behaviour that is not optimal should also be possible. 
 
 
 To properly model TFR operations, the following typical modes or operational use-cases were identified for modelling: 
o Fully fledged signaled operation 
o Track warrant operation 
ENG1 did agree and accept the case that track warrant operations may not justify driver automation safety 
augmentation systems for the following reasons: 
o The fact that track warrant operation is only practiced on lines with very low traffic densities – low safety risk 
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o The fact that these lines did not justify the implementation of conventional signalling systems to augment safety 
and do therefore not justify or require further safety augmentation. 
This reasoning resulted in the decision that track warrant not be considered for driver automation systems. 
 
 ENG1 felt that the models do not have to differentiate between the roles of sub-components within the signalling system 
(eg. remote control, interlocking, signals, points, vacancy detection, etc) but can rather describe the functions and 
behaviour of the signalling system as a whole. This should simplify the drawings considerably. 
 
 ENG1 felt that the implementation of the proposed ideal system should meet the following requirements: 
o The system should apply to movements, both in-station and in-section. 
o That the driver should not have the ability to override the safety system 
o That an optimal speed profile capability be included 
o That is must be installable on most locomotives. 
 
 As it became evident that the modelling effort could take some time, ENG1 requested that the interviewer continue 
preparing these models and present them for review. The main features and flavour of the models were discussed and 
the interview session concluded. 
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 Other observations: 
o ENG1 remarked that the relatively low number of SPAD incidents reported on the British lines may only reflect 
the fact that ATP or similar systems may be the rule. The remaining incidents may then be a reflection of non-
driver causes of SPADS such as technical problems. This may be a worthwhile question to investigate further. 
 
 On the point of challenging and varying train handling dynamics, ENG1 remarked that one of the most pronounced 
differences in handling dynamics come into play when comparing fully loaded trains vs empty trains. These 
differences recommend different driving approaches or driving styles. 
 
9.1.3 Interview findings: fully fledged signalling models 
These models attempt to describe the full extent of the cycle associated with a train movement on a fully fledged signalled 
network: The setup of the route, the traversal of the train through the route, the arrival at the limit of authority culminating in the 
route behind the stationary trains having been normalized (see figure below). No point sets have been included for the 
purpose of simplification. 
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Figure 9.1  Train movement 
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Figure 9.2  System Structure 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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Figure 9.3  System Behaviour - Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.4  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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Figure 9.5  System Behaviour - Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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The modification introduced in the proposed ideal model is indicated in BLUE. The proposed ideal model also illustrates 
specifically what would happen if a driver fails to keep to the required speed limits. 
 
[Proposed Ideal] System Structure 
The structure for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
 
[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
The Phase1 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.6  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) [Proposed ideal] 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
The Phase3 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
 
9.1.4 Interview findings: concluding remarks 
ENG1 was posed the following questions regarding the proposed ideal model developed: [ENG1’s answers in brackets] 
 Was the train driver function automation method recommended by the literature review implemented in the proposed 
ideal model? [Yes] 
o Firstly, Level 1 automation (manual driving with technical supervision) is the recommended automation model to 
be implemented. It should be noted that, to improve the practicability of the new model in the TFR railway 
environment, the model should be based on the current signalling and operational practices within TFR. 
 
o Secondly, the formal countermeasures and informal strategies presented by Naweed et al. (2015) align fairly well 
with the two elements that make up the CENELEC concept of risk (BSI, 1999). The informal strategies and vigilance 
improvement systems attempt to reduce driver error rates while intervention systems minimize the effects if driver 
errors were made. Although it is desirable to try and reduce the probability of train driver error, the methods seem 
to be somewhat open-ended as they cannot enforce safety. It does not mean that such methods are ineffective 
and should not be investigated or implemented but it can be argued that they do not present a solid foundation for 
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safety control. Reduction in the consequences seems to be the low hanging fruit in this case as it closes the loop 
in terms of safety enforcement (the result is forced) and is based on technologies that are well established and 
well understood. These systems (i.e. Automatic Train Protection and others) are based on the monitoring of human 
driver practice and enforcing safety by applying the brakes if the driver significantly exceeds the required speed 
restrictions or movement authorities. In many ways, such an approach constitutes having all of the advantages of 
using human train drivers, which has been shown to be considerable, while mitigating the disadvantages. It is 
therefore recommended to formulate and apply the new model along similar lines to ATP systems. 
 
o Thirdly, it may be worthwhile to consider adding functions that aid the driver in achieving better driving practice, 
but such functions should not form the basis of safety. 
 
 Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? [Yes] 
 
 Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR railway operations? [Yes] 
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9.2 ENG2 INTERVIEW DATA (RAW) 
This appendix presents the raw data gathered from the interview with ENG2 (real name masked). Interview data includes a 
rundown of interview activities and interview findings covering pre-modelling discussion points, generated models and 
concluding remarks. 
 
9.2.1 Interview execution 
During the interview, the following actions were performed: 
 
i. ENG2 reviewed and signed consent letter. Permission letter from TFR was made available for review if required. 
ii. ENG2 and interviewer reviewed and discussed the literature review findings and theoretical basis for the project 
approach. The review covered the following (see attached info sheet): 
 
a. Research question 
b. The appropriateness of TFR as the subject of this study 
c. Typical causes of SPADs 
d. SPADs within TFR 
e. Selected train driver automation framework 
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f. Fundamental challenges to operator automation including the ironies of automation and the hidden roles of the 
train driver. 
g. Review of the conclusion and motivation for the selection of Automation Level 1 (manual driving with technical 
supervision) as the most appropriate model of train driver automation to mitigate SPADs in the TFR environment. 
 
iii. Introduction to the selected modelling method and language. Models should at least describe system structure and 
system behaviour. 
iv. Initial modelling of system, describing how a rail movement authorization translates into an actual movement with 
emphasis on the role of the train driver. 
v. ENG2 was presented the hypothesis confirmation / rejection questions 
 
9.2.2 Interview findings: Pre-modelling discussion 
The following findings were recorded as part of the pre-modelling discussion: 
 
 ENG2 accepted the and agreed with the conclusions presented by the literature review stating that the most appropriate 
model within the given framework should be based on Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and should include 
consequences for the driver in cases where the safety system was required to intervene. 
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 ENG2 emphasized the fact that any solution should not significantly impact the train working rules (the technology 
should follow the rules and not the rues the technology) and that the solution should prioritize safety above productivity. 
 
 To properly model TFR operations the following the following modes or operational use-cases were identified for 
modelling: 
o Fully fledged signalled operation 
o Track warrant operation 
 
 As it became evident that the modelling effort could take some time, ENG2 requested that the interviewer continue 
preparing these models and present them for review. The main features and flavour of the models were discussed and 
the interview session concluded. 
 
 Other observations: 
o ENG2 made the point that the role of railway signalling is to create safe railway capacity – not only safety and not 
only capacity. 
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o ENG2 explained the following distinction between the following South African signalling conventions: 
 3 aspect signalling:  Driver to respond to signal aspect as soon as he sees it (even before he arrives at the 
signal). 
 Multi-aspect signalling:  Driver to respond to signal aspect only when he arrived at the signal location. 
 Multiple-aspect signalling:  Driver to respond to signal aspect only when he arrived at the signal location. 
 
o ENG2 mentioned that the new PRASA trains have the capability to implement full cab-signalling in the future. 
 
o As we were discussing the difficulty of a monitor/driver that has not remained in practice to step in and effectively 
take control of a train, ENG2 emphasized the fact that this may even be more difficult on Distributed Power (DP) 
trains. DP trains are freight trains that use multiple locomotives distributed throughout the train length while being 
controlled by a single driver. Controls of such trains are notoriously difficult, even for experienced drivers. 
 
 ENG2 mentioned but was not sure of the fact that the TFR CS90 system may include the feature of checking for 
conflicts while the TCO is issuing track warrants or performing manual authorizations. 
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9.2.3 Interview findings: fully fledged signalling models 
These models attempt to describe the full life cycle associated with a train movement on a fully fledged signalled network: The 
setup of the route, the traversal of the train through the route, the arrival at the limit of authority culminating in the route being 
normalized (see figure below). For simplification purposes, no points sets are included. 
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Figure 9.7  Train movement 
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Figure 9.8  System Structure 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
Define Route
TCO
Interlocking
Remote Control Receive and Transmit
Route definition
Receive Route definition
Route 
Available?
Reserve and Lock
Route Elemets
Report Route Setup Failure
No
Yes
Receive and Transmit
Failure Report
Receive
Failure Report
Route
Definition
Route
Definition
Failure
Report
Report Successful
Route Setup
Receive and Transmit
Route Success Report
Receive
Route Success Report
Success 
Report
Ph2
AND OR
AND OR
Failure
Report
Success 
Report
AND
AND
 
Figure 9.9  System Behaviour - Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.10  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
160 
 
 
[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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Figure 9.11  System Behaviour - Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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The modification introduced in the proposed ideal model is indicated in BLUE. Phase1 for the proposed ideal system 
behaviour is not indicated as it is the same as that of the current practice model. The proposed ideal model also illustrates 
specifically what would happen if a driver fails to keep to the required speed limits. 
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Figure 9.12  System Structure [Proposed ideal] 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
The Phase1 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.13  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) [Proposed ideal] 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
The Phase3 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
 
9.2.4 Interview findings: Track Warrant signalling models 
These models attempt to describe the full life cycle associated with a train movement on a Track Warrant network: The setup 
of the route, the traversal of the train through the route, the arrival at the limit of authority (represented by a points) culminating 
in the route being normalized (see figure below). 
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Figure 9.14  Train movement 
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Figure 9.15  System Structure 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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Figure 9.16  System Behaviour - Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
 
168 
 
 
[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.17  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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Figure 9.18  System Behaviour - Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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The modification introduced in the proposed ideal model is indicated in BLUE. The proposed ideal model also illustrates 
specifically what would happen if a driver fails to keep to the required speed limits. 
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Figure 9.19  System Structure [Proposed ideal] 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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Figure 9.20  System Behaviour - Phase1 (Movement Setup) [Proposed ideal] 
172 
 
 
 
[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.21  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) [Proposed ideal] 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
The Phase3 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice. 
 
9.2.5 Interview findings: concluding remarks 
ENG2 was posed the following questions regarding the proposed ideal model developed: [ENG2’s answers in brackets] 
 Was the train driver function automation method recommended by the literature review implemented in the proposed 
ideal model? [Yes] 
o Firstly, Level 1 automation (manual driving with technical supervision) is the recommended automation model to 
be implemented. It should be noted that, to improve the practicability of the new model in the TFR railway 
environment, the model should be based on the current signalling and operational practices within TFR. 
 
o Secondly, the formal countermeasures and informal strategies presented by Naweed et al. (2015) align fairly well 
with the two elements that make up the CENELEC concept of risk (BSI, 1999). The informal strategies and vigilance 
improvement systems attempt to reduce driver error rates while intervention systems minimize the effects if driver 
errors were made. Although it is desirable to try and reduce the probability of train driver error, the methods seem 
to be somewhat open-ended as they cannot enforce safety. It does not mean that such methods are ineffective 
and should not be investigated or implemented but it can be argued that they do not present a solid foundation for 
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safety control. Reduction in the consequences seems to be the low hanging fruit in this case as it closes the loop 
in terms of safety enforcement (the result is forced) and is based on technologies that are well established and 
well understood. These systems (i.e. Automatic Train Protection and others) are based on the monitoring of human 
driver and enforcing safety by applying the brakes if the driver significantly exceeds the required speed restrictions 
or movement authorities. In many ways such an approach constitutes having all of the advantages of having a 
human train driver, which has been shown to be considerable, while mitigating the disadvantages. It is therefore 
recommended to model the new model along similar lines to ATP systems. 
 
o Thirdly, it may worthwhile to consider adding functions that aids the driver in better driving but such functions 
should not form the basis of safety. 
 
 Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? [Yes] 
 
 Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR railway operations? [Yes]  
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9.3 ENG3 INTERVIEW DATA (RAW) 
This appendix presents the raw data gathered from the interview with ENG3 (real name masked). Interview data includes a 
rundown of interview activities and interview findings covering pre-modelling discussion points, generated models and 
concluding remarks. 
 
9.3.1 Interview execution 
During the interview, the following actions were performed: 
 
i. ENG3 reviewed and signed consent letter. 
ii. ENG3 and interviewer reviewed and discussed the literature review findings and theoretical basis for the project 
approach. The review covered the following (see attached info sheet): 
 
a. Research question 
b. Typical causes of SPADs 
c. Selected train driver automation framework 
d. Fundamental challenges to operator automation including the ironies of automation and the hidden roles of the 
train driver. 
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e. Review of the conclusion and motivation for the selection of Automation Level 1 (manual driving with technical 
supervision) as the most appropriate model of train driver automation to mitigate SPADs in the TFR environment. 
 
iii. The main conclusions, recommendations and models generated by ENG1 and ENG2 was presented to ENG3 for 
confirmation purposes and comment. 
iv. ENG3 was presented with the hypothesis confirmation / rejection questions 
 
9.3.2 Interview findings: Pre-modelling discussion 
The following findings were recorded as part of the pre-modelling discussion: 
 
 ENG3 accepted and agreed with the conclusions presented by the literature review, ENG1 and ENG2, stating that the 
most appropriate model within the given framework should be based on Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and that the 
inclusion of consequences for bad train driving is reasonable. 
 
 ENG3 recommended that any system implementation should not clutter the train cab with screens that divert driver 
attention from watching the road but should aim to make the driving activity as easy as possible while leaving the driver 
in complete control of the train. 
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 ENG3 also recommended that from both a design and modelling point of view, the Remote Control system, as an 
interface between the TCO and the interlocking, should be as transparent as possible. 
 
 When asked about the appropriate level of detail for the models, ENG3 did not indicate a specific preference, stating 
that the levels presented by both ENG1 and ENG2 were acceptable to him. 
 
 Commenting on the current implementation of the VDU Warrant system where an train-borne On-Board Computer 
(OBC) system is used to perform safety interlocking functions in Track Warrant operations, ENG3 expressed the 
following concern: 
 
o The insufficient safety rating of the equipment used to perform safety functions (similar to those of an ATP 
system) may lead to safety incidents in the future. This is especially true in those cases where signalling 
information fed through a non-vital remote control is relied upon for train protection. 
 
178 
 
 
9.3.3 Interview findings: fully fledged as well as track warrant signalling models 
These models attempt to describe the full life cycle associated with a train movement on a fully fledged signalled network 
(Figure 9.22) as well as a Track warrant network (Figure 9.23). The movement starts with the setup of the route, followed by 
the traversal of the train through the route and arrival at the limit of authority, culminating in the route being normalized. For the 
track warrant movement, the speed limit is communicated to the driver by a speed board and the limit of movement is 
indicated by the points set (see Figure 9.23). 
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Signal
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Proceed
Signal
 
Figure 9.22  Movement on Fully Fledged Signalled Network 
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Figure 9.23  Movement on Track Warrant Network 
 
When the modelling level of abstraction is set to the signalling system level instead of signalling system component level, the 
differences in structure and behaviour between that of the fully fledged signalling system and that of a Track Warrant system 
disappear, resulting in a generic model applicable to both modes of operation. Differences between the systems should only 
come into play when considering the actual implementation where the fully fledged signalling system may require a more 
safety conscious design and consist of components with higher safety ratings than that of the Track Warrant system. 
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[Current Practice] System Structure 
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Figure 9.24  System Structure 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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** Note: Failure to setup route should lead to the TCO having to try again. If the failure presists, the TCO may
                 have to fall back to a manual or abnormal authorization method (Outside the scope of this model).
 
Figure 9.25  System Behaviour - Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.26  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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[Current Practice] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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Figure 9.27  System Behaviour - Phase3 (End of Authority) 
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The modifications introduced in the proposed ideal model is indicated in BLUE. The proposed ideal model also illustrates 
specifically what would happen if a driver fails to keep to the required speed limits. 
 
[Proposed Ideal] System Structure 
The structure for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice model. 
 
[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase1 (Movement Setup) 
The Phase1 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice model. 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase2 (Route Traversal) 
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Figure 9.28  System Behaviour - Phase2 (Route Traversal) [Proposed ideal] 
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[Proposed Ideal] System Behaviour – Phase3 (End of Authority) 
The Phase3 behaviour for the proposed ideal system remains the same as that of the current practice model. 
 
9.3.4 Interview findings: concluding remarks 
ENG3 was posed the following questions regarding the proposed ideal model developed: [ENG3’s answers in brackets] 
 Was the train driver function automation method recommended by the literature review implemented in the proposed 
ideal model? [Yes] 
o Firstly, Level 1 automation (manual driving with technical supervision) is the recommended automation model to 
be implemented. It should be noted that, to improve the practicability of the new model in the TFR railway 
environment, the model should be based on the current signalling and operational practices within TFR. 
 
o Secondly, the formal countermeasures and informal strategies presented by Naweed et al. (2015) align fairly well 
with the two elements that make up the CENELEC concept of risk (BSI, 1999). The informal strategies and vigilance 
improvement systems attempt to reduce driver error rates while intervention systems minimize the effects if driver 
errors were made. Although it is desirable to try and reduce the probability of train driver error, the methods seem 
to be somewhat open-ended as they cannot enforce safety. It does not mean that such methods are ineffective 
and should not be investigated or implemented but it can be argued that they do not present a solid foundation for 
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safety control. Reduction in the consequences seems to be the low hanging fruit in this case as it closes the loop 
in terms of safety enforcement (the result is forced) and is based on technologies that are well established and 
well understood. These systems (i.e. Automatic Train Protection and others) are based on the monitoring of human 
driver and enforcing safety by applying the brakes if the driver significantly exceeds the required speed restrictions 
or movement authorities. In many ways such an approach constitutes having all of the advantages of having a 
human train driver, which has been shown to be considerable, while mitigating the disadvantages. It is therefore 
recommended to model the new model along similar lines to ATP systems. 
 
o Thirdly, it may worthwhile to consider adding functions that aids the driver in better driving but such functions 
should not form the basis of safety. 
 
 Should this method prove effective in the mitigation of SPADs? [Yes] 
 
 Can this model be considered as the ‘most appropriate’ within TFR railway operations? [Yes] 
